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'KATAKS', KADAZAN-DUSUN NATIONALISM AND 
DEVELOPMENT: 
THE 1999 SABAH STATE ELECTION 
UNG HO CHIN 
INTRODUCTION 
The 1999 Sabah election was held amidst great expectations among political 
observers and the public. It was the first election to be held since Malaysia 
plunged into a recession caused by the Asian currency crisis two years 
earlier. The ringgit was no longer convertible and Prime Minister Mahathir 
Mohamad had sacked his deputy, Anwar Ibrahim, over differences in 
economic policy and Anwar' s attempts to unseat the long serving prime 
minister. Anwar staged rallies throughout Peninsular Malaysia and was 
subsequently arrested and charged with corruption and sodomy. Anwar' s 
expulsion from the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) had 
raised questions about Mahathir' s hold on Malaysia's dominant party and 
about his grip on power. There were comparisons, although inappropriate, 
between the Mahathir regime and the Soeharto regime in Indonesia. There 
were widespread street demonstrations in Kuala Lumpur calling for the 
resignation of Mahathir over the Anwar affair. The Mahathir regime was 
arguably facing its most serious political crisis since coming into office in 
198 1 .  After several months a new deputy prime minister, Abdullah Badawi, 
was appointed. 
Badawi visited Sabah four times in the first two months of his 
appointment, signalling that he was going to be the key federal man in 
charge of the upcoming Sabah election. His predecessor had played a key 
role in the 1994 Sabah election and Abdullah was expected to pick up where 
Anwar had left off. With general elections anticipated within a year of the 
Sabah election, the Sabah polls were seen by some in the peninsula as a 
litmus test for the general election and a general test of Mahathir' s personal 
popularity and of the regime's ability to hang on to power. 
In Sabah, expectations were remarkably high as many saw the election 
as a crucial test of the ability of the ruling Sabah Barisan National (BN or 
National Front) to win outright. In the last polls, the opposition Parti Bersatu 
Sabah (PBS or Sabah Unity Party) had won the election but widespread 
defections to Sabah BN led to its downfall. The subsequent formation of the 
Sabah BN government, with support from the defectors, had led many to 
question its political legitimacy. The election was thus an opportunity for 
Sabah BN to get a proper mandate from the people. 
Sabah Politics 
Politics in Sabah is characterized by four features. First, there has been fierce 
competition for political power between the three politically significant 
groups: the Muslim bumiputera, or indigenous peoples, the non-Muslim 
bumiputera (mainly Kadazan-Dusun), and the Chinese community. Sabah's 
two million population is roughly divided into 40 per cent Muslim 
indigenous, 40 per cent non-Muslim indigenous, and 20 per cent Chinese 
and other non-indigenous. 
Secondly, there has been constant shifting of political loyalties. Sabah 
governments tend to fall within a decade of coming into power. Tun 
Mustapha Harun and his party, the United Sabah National Organisation 
(USNO), ruled Sabah from 1967 to 1 975 before he was thrown out by the 
electorate in favour of Parti Bersatu Rakyat Jelata Sabah (Berjaya or Sabah 
Peoples' United Front). Berjaya under Harris Salleh governed Sabah until 
1985 when it was dislodged by PBS. The PBS government under Joseph 
Pairin Kitingan lasted until 1994 when defections caused its downfall. Since 
then, Sabah has been ruled by the Sabah BN coalition led by Sabah UMNO. 
Both Mustapha and Harris are Muslims while Pairin is a Roman Catholic. 
Thus, for the most part, a Muslim has headed the Sabah government. 1 
Thirdly, vote-buying, using cash, and other forms of inducements are 
key ingredients for political mobilization and securing electoral support. 
Large amounts of money are spent on elections by all parties and candidates 
to secure votes. Many voters expect to be compensated in some form for 
their votes. Giving 'coffee money' or 'transport money' is widely seen as an 
acceptable form of securing political support on polling day. Once a party 
gets into power, it is further expected to reward its supporters through the 
distribution of state resources, such as timber licenses, mining rights or 
government contracts. Patronage plays a key part in cementing political 
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support and defections. This leads to a high degree of corruption as those in 
power seek to enrich themselves and their parties in order to survive 
politically. 
Fourthly, prior to Sabah's  entry into the federation of Malaysia in 
1 963 , S abah (and neighbouring Sarawak) demanded constitutional 
guarantees and autonomies in certain areas. These special rights, applying 
only to Sabah and Sarawak, were spelt out in the 1962 Inter-Government 
Committee (IGC) Report (Government of Malaya 1963). The main features 
of the safeguards (generally referred to as the 'Twenty Points' )  were: 
(a) Islam's status as a national religion was not applicable to Sarawak 
and Sabah; 
(b) immigration control was vested in the state governments of Sabah 
and Sarawak; 
(c) Borneonization of the civil service, and English as the official 
language of both states, were recognized; 
(d) no amendments or modification of any specific safeguards granted 
under the Twenty Points can be made by the federal government 
without the agreement of the Sabah and S arawak state 
governments, and 
(e) there would be no right to secede from the Federation. 
Since then, one of the key political debates in Sabah (and Sarawak) has been 
over how thoroughly the federal government has kept to the promises made 
in the IGC Report. The federal government' s  position has been that these 
constitutional guarantees were transitional in nature and would be scrapped 
in the future in the interests of national integration .2 Many S abahans, 
however, argue that the future of these rights was not up to the federal 
government but rather up to the peoples of Sabah and Sarawak. Critics argue 
that the federal government has not adhered to the Twenty Points and has 
circumvented many of them, especially in areas of religion and 
Borneonization of the civil service. Islam was made the official religion of 
S abah (and Sarawak) despite the guarantee. Many senior officers in 
government departments in Sabah were from Peninsular Malaysia despite 
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the explicit promise to give first preference to local civil servants under the 
Borneonization pledge. 
Many Sabahans are also critical of political interference from Kuala 
Lumpur. A popular slogan has been 'Sabah for the Sabahans ' ,  and Kuala 
Lumpur has been seen as the 'new colonizer' .  There is also widespread 
resentment over the massive transfer of wealth from Sabah' s petroleum and 
other natural resources to the national coffers. A recent study suggests that 
Sabah has generated more wealth for the federal government than it receives 
from Kuala Lumpur in terms of development grants and financial aid (Wee 
1995) .  
The anti-federal fervour has been compounded by the large number of 
illegal Filipino (and a smaller number of Indonesian) migrants living, more 
or less permanently, in Sabah. Many non-Muslim Sabahans resent these 
foreigners and blame the federal government for the situation. B order 
controls and security come under the purview of the federal government and 
many Sabahans suspect that the federal government has taken a relaxed 
attitude towards these migrants. The suspicions are grounded in the fact that 
almost all these illegal migrants are Muslims and a substantial number of 
them vote (illegally) in elections using identity cards issued illegally by the 
federal-controlled Department of Registration. Many of these Muslim 
migrants are known to strongly support the ruling BN dominated by UMNO. 
UMNO is unashamedly for the Malay race and Islam (see Crouch 1 996). 
Many suspect that the federal government has tried to use these Muslim 
migrants to increase the Muslim population in Sabah and so alter the state' s  
population in favour o f  Muslims, increasing its political power 
correspondingly. 
Kadazan-Dusun Nationalism and PBS's formation 
The fierce political competition between the Muslim and the Kadazan-Dusun 
community in the past decade can be largely explained by the rise of 
Kadazan-Dusun nationalism, which found an outlet to express itself 
politically through the PBS .  
The Kadazan-Dusun community constitute about 4 0  per cent of 
Sabah' s population, and, as such, always saw themselves as the anchor of 
Sabah politics .  The first chief minister after independence in 1 963 was 
Donald Stephens, a Kadazan nationalist. He was the first Huguan Siou 
(paramount chief) of the Kadazan-Dusun and founded the United Pasek 
Momogun Kadazandusun Organisation (UPKO), a party that explicitly seeks 
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to represent the community. However, by 1 967 Stephens was pushed out of 
office by a Muslim, Tun Mustapha Harun, with support from Kuala 
Lumpur. It took a decade before Stephens (and the Kadazan-Dusun) was 
back in power through a new party, Berjaya. Berjaya won convincingly in 
the 1976 election when it took 28 to USNO' s 20 seats. 
Fuad's rule, however, was to last less than three months. On 6 June 
1976, Fuad and three senior leaders of Berjaya: Peter Mojuntin, Salleh 
Sulong and Chong Thaim Vun, were tragically killed in a plane crash. Harris 
Salleh, a Muslim, was sworn in as Fuad' s successor. The Kadazan-Dusun' s 
dream of coming back into power died in the plane crash. 
After that the Kadazan-Dusun community searched for a leader who 
could take Stephens' s place. It took more than a decade before a new 
Huguan Siou emerged with the same legitimacy as Stephens: Joseph Pairin 
Kitingan. 
Pairin' s  rise can be traced back to the Berjaya government led by 
Harris. Harris appointed a Kadazan-Dusun, James Ongkili, as deputy chief 
minister while Pairin was made a junior minister. Ongkili, an academic 
historian who taught at Universiti Malaya before entering politics ,  was 
deemed ineffective, and was widely seen by his community as too 
accommodating to the Muslims. The Kadazan-Dusun were increasing 
anxious about four issues: Islamization, discrimination in the civil service, 
the 'pribumi' label and the influx of Muslim Filipinos. 
Although high-handed tactics of lslamization ceased with the defeat of 
Mus tap ha in 1 97 6, subtle attempts at conversion to Islam were still carried 
out among the predominantly Roman Catholic Kadazan-Dusun and other 
indigenous communities. Harris's victory in the 1981  state elections had 
made Islamic activists in Berjaya more assertive. The election result 
indicated that Berjaya had captured the Muslim vote (21 of 44 successful 
Berjaya candidates in the 1981 state election were Muslims).  This meant that 
the Muslims in Berjaya controlled about half of Berjaya' s elected 
representatives and they began to agitate for more pro-Islamic policies. 
Pressure was put on non-Muslim indigenous to convert, and big conversion 
ceremonies began to appear in non-Muslim areas, the same sort of 
ceremonies that were held during Mustapha's reign. 
The Kadazan-Dusun also felt uneasy about their political status. 
Although they were officially classified as 'bumiputera' and thus eligible for 
special state benefits such as scholarships, bank loans and recruitment into 
the civil service, in reality they were discriminated against in favour of 
Muslim bumiputera. The Kadazan-Dusun felt that they were ' second-class' 
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bumiputera.3 There was anger that all the senior positions in the Sabah civil 
service were held by Peninsular Malays and that there was an active 
unofficial policy of discrimination against them in the higher echelons of the 
civil service. It was known that it was easier for a Kadazan-Dusun civil 
servant to be promoted if he was to convert to Islam (Kitingan 1986; Kahin 
1992; Loh 1992; Yee 1 992). 
The Kadazan-Dusun sense of being ' second-class'  bumiputera was 
compounded by Harris's decision to lump the Kadazan with other indigenous 
groupings in the 1980 census. Prior to 1 980, the Kadazan were categorized 
as a separate entity, but in the 1 980 census they were classified simply as 
'pribumi ' , a collective term for all indigenous groupings in Sabah. The 
Berjaya administration had also changed the character of the Kadazan 
Harvest Festival (Tadau Tagaw Kaamatan) by relegating it into a Pesta 
Rakyat, open to all races. These moves were seen by the Kadazan-Dusun as 
blatant attempts to diminish their strong ethnic and cultural identity. 
The unhappiness was compounded by the influx of Muslim Filipinos. 
The Kadazan-Dusun (and the Chinese) were worried that the Muslim 
Filipinos could alter the delicate political balance between the Muslim and 
non-Muslim communities in Sabah. Although the non-Muslims were in the 
majority in the state, the large influx of Muslim Filipinos (numbering about 
half a million) reduced the gap between the Muslims and non-Muslims 
significantly and quickly. Berjaya's excuse for not doing anything about the 
influx of Muslim Filipinos was that border and security issues were under 
the purview of the federal government. Moreover, according to Harris, it 
would be physically impossible to send all the Filipinos home. 
All these four issues were raised repeatedly in the state cabinet by 
Pairin. He demanded forcible repatriation of the Muslim Filipinos, 
promotion of the Kadazan-Dusun culture and language, a halt to forced 
conversion to Islam, and that the Sabah government give financial assistance 
to Church activities, in the same way that state funds were given for dakwah 
(missionary) activities of the Sabah State Muslim Organisation (MUIS) .  
Pairin's reputation for raising these issues earned him the respect of  many 
Kadazan-Dusun, especially the influential educated Kadazan-Dusun middle 
class. 
Pairin began to revive the Kadazan Cultural Association (KCA), a 
powerful grassroots organization, and in 1 982 he was made Huguan Siou, 
the first Kadazan to hold the title since the death of Stephens. In other words, 
the Kadazan community had a new champion after 1 976. 
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Pairin's strong non-Muslim views boiled over in the 1983 Berjaya 
party congress. Before that, in July 1982, Harris had sacked Pairin from the 
state cabinet. At the party congress, Pairin again raised the grievances of the 
Kadazan-Dusun and non-Muslim communities, prompting Harris to expel 
him from the party in the middle of the congress. Harris then pulled out an 
undated letter of resignation Pairin had signed when he was elected in 1981, 
forcing a by-election in the Tambunan constituency. The by-election was 
held in December 1984 and the result was never in doubt. Standing as an 
independent, Pairin's emotional call to Kadazan-Dusun nationalism meant 
that the Berjaya candidate, Roger Ongkili, a nephew of Pairin, never stood 
any chance. Ongkili was beaten by a margin of four to one. 
The humiliation for Harris was too much for him to bear and he 
publicly punished the people of Tambunan by withdrawing Tambunan's 
status as a district. Tambunan was placed under the control of the Keningau 
District Office and all government facilities in Tambunan were withdrawn 
(Daily Express 1 January 1985). This action merely reinforced Kadazan­
Dusuns' feeling that they were being persecuted by Harris and the Muslims. 
With the Kadazan-Dusun strongly supportive of Pairin, Harris, hoping 
to prevent further erosion of support, decided to call an election in April 
1985. Harris wanted to move quickly as Pairin had already registered a new 
Kadazan-Dusun-based political party, Parti Bersatu Sabah (PBS). 
On 5 March 1985 Kuala Lumpur approved PBS's application and 
Pairin unveiled PBS's symbol, two hands clasped together over a map of 
Sabah. It was meant to symbolize friendship and cooperation among the 
peoples of Sabah. However, the symbol was politically potent for another 
reason : it was almost an exact copy of the symbol used earlier by the 
congregation of Sabah's Catholic parishes, with only the cross missing. The 
meaning was clear to the Catholic/Christian community: although PBS was 
multi-racial, PBS would fight for the rights of the non-Muslim community 
after years of suppression by successive Muslim-led governments. The tone 
of the campaign was thus Muslims vs non-Muslims. 
Although PBS was barely a month-old, it swept to power, winning 25 
of the 48 seats in the state legislature. In fact, PBS took 26 seats when the 
only successful Pasok candidate, Ignatius Malanjun in Moyong, joined PBS. 
USNO took 16 seats and Berjaya was left with just 6 (Puthucheary 1985; 
Kalimuthu 1986). PBS won because it had the near total support of the 
Kadazan and Chinese votes. The Kadazan-Dusun were back in power again. 
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Sabah Elections 
Within the Malaysian political system, parliamentary and state elections are 
usually held at the same time. The only exceptions are the East Malaysian 
states of Sabah and Sarawak.4 Due to their unique histories and different 
levels of political development, state and parliamentary elections are usually 
held on different dates. This has allowed a degree of separation of issues for 
parliamentary and state elections. Nation-wide issues play a much more 
important role in national parliamentary elections while state issues tend to 
dominate state elections. Even in national elections, however, due to the 
parochial nature of politics in both states, nation-wide issues tend to be 
subservient to state issues. Thus, issues dominating the headlines in 
Peninsular Malaysia, such as the sacking of Anwar Ibrahim and his 
subsequent trial, do not have much impact on politics and electoral 
behaviour in Sabah and Sarawak. In fact, the Anwar episode was generally 
seen as a non-issue by all the major combatants in the 1999 election in 
Sabah. In 1995 , the Chinese voters on the peninsula strongly backed the 
Mahathir regime. In contrast, the Chinese voters in Sabah were lukewarm 
towards the ruling BN coalition and their vote was split between the PBS 
and BN (see Chin 1996b, 1996c). 
The federal govemment/UMNO takes elections in Sabah seriously for 
the simple fact that they worry that strong anti-federal sentiments may lead 
to attempts to secede from the federation. Unlike states on the peninsular, 
Sabah and Sarawak are separated physically from Kuala Lumpur by the 
South China Sea. The different histories and demography of Sabah and 
Sarawak also make them likely candidates to pull out of the federation if 
there were any attempts to break up the federation. Many senior UMNO 
leaders still harbour fears that Sabah and Sarawak may tum into 'another 
Singapore' if they are not kept under a watchful eye (Chin 1997). 5 
ELECTORAL SETTINGS 
The 1994 Poll and its Aftermath 
The previous state election was held in February 1994. The results were 
close: PBS won 25 seats to Sabah BN's 23 (Sabah UMNO 18; SAPP 3 ;  LDP 
1; AK.AR 1). Of the 436,448 votes cast, PBS took 215, 952 votes (49.5 per 
cent) and BN 201,374 (46.1 per cent); the rest went to the smaller parties and 
independents (New Straits Times 21 February 1994; Chin 1994). The results 
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indicated that voting was along ethnic/religious lines: PBS took all the 15 
Kadazan-Dusun majority constituencies while Sabah UMNO won all its 18 
seats in Muslim-majority constituencies. With the Chinese vote partially 
split, the seven Chinese-majority constituencies were divided between PBS 
(which won 4) and BN (3). 
Although PBS won the election narrowly, the Pairin-led 
administration collapsed within three weeks when Sabah UMNO 
successfully enticed key PBS legislators to defect. The going rate for the 
early defectors was said to be three million ringgit. 6 The final blow to Pairin 
came when his younger brother, Jeffrey Kitingan, announced that he was 
leaving PBS to form a new party, Parti Demokratik Sabah Bersatu (PDSB), 
which would ultimately seek to join the BN.7 Another key PBS strongman, 
the party's secretary general, Joseph Kurup, also left and formed Parti 
Bersatu Rakyat Sabah (PBRS). Kurup joined the BN coalition immediately. 
Yet another key PBS figure and former deputy chief minister, Bernard 
Dompok, formed Parti Demokratik Sabah (PDS) and it too became a 
component of the BN. 
Initially Pairin tried to call for another state election, but the governor 
refused his request to dissolve the state assembly (which had yet to sit). The 
governor claimed that the Sabah BN should be given a chance to form the 
state government if it had the numbers. The governor could hardly be neutral 
towards Pairin, given that his son had just been elected as a Sabah UMNO 
assemblyman. 
A new state government was thus formed with Sabah UMNO at the 
core, and Sakaran Dandai was sworn in as the new chief minister on 17 
March 1994. Mahathir announced that the federal government would honor 
its election pledge that the Sabah chief ministership would be rotated every 
two years between Muslim bumiputera, non-Muslim bumiputera and 
Chinese leaders. The triumvirate system was supposed to stop one leader, or 
one ethnic group, from adopting the 'grab-all' mentality practised in Sabah. 
More importantly, it was to ensure that the BN would be able to secure 
support from the three main political groupings in Sabah (Daily Express 
[Kota Kinabalu] 21 March 1994). Sakaran served for a few months until he 
was made Sabah governor in December 1994 (a post he still occupies). He 
was replaced by another Sabah UMNO nominee, Mohd Salleh Tun Said 
Keruak, the son of the previous governor. 
In March 1996, after Sabah UMNO had held the chief ministership for 
two years, it was the tum of the Chinese to take over under the rotation 
system. This created a mini-crisis when Sabah UMNO decided that it was 
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unwilling to give up the office. After all, Sabah UMNO had the single 
largest number of legislators in the state assembly. They were not keen to 
see a Chinese taking over the most powerful office in the state. Mahathir had 
to force Sabah UMNO to give up the post. One of the key reasons why the 
BN did well in the 1994 state election was the promise of a rotation system 
for the chief minister. If this promise had not been kept, there was a real 
likelihood that the voters would tum against BN, and especially Sabah 
UMNO, in the next election. Mahathir's then deputy, Anwar Ibrahim, had to 
go to Kota Kinabalu personally to persuade Sabah UMNO to drop its 
objections.8 The Sabah UMNO representatives finally agreed to drop their 
objections when Mahathir promised them that Sabah UMNO could still exert 
major influence in the state government through the number of state cabinet 
posts given to Sabah UMNO. Sabah UMNO was promised the largest share 
of the state cabinet, with four full ministers, including a deputy chief 
ministership. 
Mahathir also acceded to Sabah UMNO's request that the bulk of the 
chief minister's discretionary powers be transferred to cabinet where it had 
the numbers. Prior to that, the position of Sabah chief minister was all 
powerful - the chief minister could, for example, decide on land matters 
single-handedly without going to the state cabinet. This gave the chief 
minister tremendous political patronage; it was common practice for the 
chief minister to grant mining, land and timber concessions as a political 
reward, to cement political ties, or simply to raise money for elections.9 In 
June 1996, four bills - the Forestry Enactment Amendment, the Mining 
Ordinance, the Sabah Land Ordinance Amendment, and the Delegation of 
Powers Ordinance - effectively stripped the chief minister of his absolute 
discretion when it came to land matters and the granting of mining and 
timber concessions. Obviously Sabah UMNO wanted to make sure it could 
still influence 'who gets what' once it was out of the chief minister's office. 
This was the price the Chinese and the non-Muslim bumiputera community 
had to pay if they wanted the rotation system to continue (interview with a 
PBS figure). 
SAPP' s Yong Teck Lee was finally sworn in as chief minister on 28 
May 1996, and two weeks later, on 18 June, the four amendments limiting 
the powers of the chief minister were passed in the state legislative 
assembly. Yong served a full two years before he handed power over to 
Bernard Dompok, a non-Muslim bumiputera , on 29 May 1998. 
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The 1995 Sabah Parliamentary Elections 
In April 1995, Mahathir called for a general election. This was the first 
election to be held since the fall of the PBS administration in March 1994. 
Although in general parliamentary elections are less important than state 
elections in Sabah, the PBS made a great effort in the election to prove that 
its political support was intact despite the defections. The voters were told 
that the parliamentary election was an opportunity to 'punish' the political 
'ka,taks' (frogs) who had jumped from the PBS into the BN. This was 
especially so in the Kadazan-Dusun seats where the voters were told to 
discard those Kadazan-Dusun representatives who had 'sold out' their race 
by defecting to the BN. 
The BN was sufficiently worried about PBS that it issued a special BN 
supplementary manifesto specifically targeted at Sabah voters. The Outline 
Perspective Plan for Sabah (OPPS) promised that Sabah would be on par 
economically with Peninsular Malaysia by 2010. Needless to say, this was 
only achievable under a BN administration. During the campaign period, 
projects amounting to more than M$2billion were pledged by the BN leaders 
(Borneo Mail 18, 19 April 1995). The explicit choice facing the voters was 
best summed up by the Sabah UMNO chief minister: 'The election provides 
the people with a choice between BN's politics of development or PBS 
politics of sentiment' (New Straits Times 25 April 1995). 
The results were: BN 12 constituencies (Sabah UMNO 8, SAPP 3,  
LDP 1) and PBS 8. The voting pattern barely differed from the 1994 
election. The BN took 5 2. 7  per cent of the vote, about 5 per cent more than 
in 1994. PBS took about 10 per cent less at 42.3 per cent of the popular vote, 
a drop of about 7 per cent compared to 1994. Voting was again clearly along 
ethnic/religious lines. Sabah UMNO dominated in the Muslim-majority 
constituencies where it took 62.5 per cent of the popular vote, compared 
with PBS's 36.6 per cent. In 1994, in the Muslim areas, BN received 55 .9  
per cent while the PBS got 41.0 per cent. Sabah UMNO had strengthened its 
hold over the Muslim territories while PBS lost some ground. 
In the 1994 election, the Chinese community was almost equally split 
between PBS (50.0 per cent) and BN (47.0 per cent). This pattern was 
repeated in 1995. BN received 43.6  per cent of the vote while PBS was close 
behind at 37. 2  per cent. DAP took a significant 16.7 per cent of the vote. 
Assuming that DAP voters would have voted for PBS if the party had 
formed an alliance with PBS against BN, one could argue that more than 
half of the voters in the Chinese constituencies were against BN; hence the 
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Chinese vote had split. Had there been an alliance between PBS and DAP, 
they could easily have won at least 2 constituencies (Gaya and Sandakan). 
This was the political price paid for the inability of PBS and DAP to form an 
alliance. Put another way, the victories of SAPP and LDP were the result of 
the split in Chinese votes, and DAP gained at the expense of both BN and 
PBS.  This suggested that while about half of the Sabah Chinese voters 
supported the opposition, about a fifth of the Chinese voters were hard-core 
supporters of the DAP.10 
In the Kadazan-Dusun areas, PBS took nearly 60 per cent of the 
popular vote against BN's 40.7  per cent. The Kadazan-Dusun voters' support 
for PBS remained intact and all BN Kadazan-Dusun-based parties were 
defeated. One of PBS ' s  key defectors, Jeffrey Kitingan, was decisively 
defeated by PBS ' s  Maximus Ongkili, Jeffery's nephew.  Another key 
defector, Bernard Dompok, was also decisively defeated by a PBS candidate. 
Almost all the BN votes in the Kadazan-Dusun constituencies came from the 
Muslims. This is best illustrated in the Panampang constituency, where the 
composition of the voters was: 40.3 per cent Muslim bumiputera, 36. 5  per 
cent Non-Muslim bumiputera, 21.0 per cent Chinese and 2.2 per cent Others. 
The PBS candidate, Paul N ointien, obtained 5 1. 9 per cent of the vote and his 
opponent, Bernard Dompok, received 45 . 9  per cent. Assuming that the 
Muslim vote was firmly behind the BN candidate, Dompok managed to 
secure only about 5-8 per cent of the non-Muslim (read Kadazan-Dusun) 
vote. Overall, however, the BN machinery made a significant gain in the 
non-Muslim areas . Compared to the 1994 results (BN 28.9 per cent, PBS 
64.7 per cent), BN has managed to swing about 12 per cent of the non­
Muslim bumiputera vote in its favor. 
The defeat of all Kadazan-Dusun BN candidates completely wiped out 
the Kadazan-Dusun representatives in the federal government - Jeffrey 
Kitingan was a deputy federal housing and local government minister while 
Dompok was a minister in the Prime Minister's Department. After the 
election, in an apparent snub to the Kadazan-Dusun community for voting 
against the BN, Mahathir appointed the LDP president, Chong Kah Kiat (an 
ethnic Chinese) ,  to a federal cabinet post usually reserved for a non-Muslim 
Kadazan-Dusun. 
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Gerrymandering and Phantom Voters 
Since the first state election thirty-two years ago, Sabah has delineated its 
electoral boundaries three times. From the original 32 state seats in the 
1967 polls, the number was increased to 48 before the third state election in 
1976. When Labuan became a federal territory in 1983 the electoral 
boundaries were again delineated. The latest delineation was gazetted in 
1994. These redrawn boundaries were being used in the 1999 election. 
Though the number of state constituencies remained at 48, two non-Muslim 
bumiputera seats were taken off the electoral map and the ethnic 
composition of the voters was completely transformed in  certain seats. 
'Comers' of more than twenty seats were carved out and added to other 
constituencies and some seats renamed during the redelineation exercise. 
Tenom was renamed Melalap, Buang Sayang became Pantai Manis 
and Sipitang, Sindumin. Sook and Langkon gave way to Senallang and 
Kalabakan in the Muslim-majority east coast of Sabah. Part of Langkon was 
merged with the nearby Tandek and Matunggong constituencies. In the 
case of Sook, it was merged with the existing Pensiangan constituency on 
one side and with the former Tenom seat on another to give birth to Melalap. 
Both Senallang and Kalabakan were cut from existing seats in two other 
areas where Muslim bumiputera voters made up the majority. Other 
changes to the constituencies were less obvious but nevertheless altered the 
ethnic voting possibility. Inanam, for example, which had been a 
predominantly non-Muslim bumiputera constituency, became a Chinese­
majority area after its electoral border with Likas was changed. Likas, which 
had comprised a mix of Muslim bumiputera and non-Muslim voters, 
became a Muslim bumiputera majority area. 
The original 32  state constituencies were drawn up so that there was 
an equal number of Muslim and non-Muslim seats. this resulted in the 
Chinese becoming the balancing power. The electoral boundaries were 
changed before 197 6, and the number of state seats was increased to the 
present 48, creating 22 Muslim-majority constituencies, 18 non-Muslim and 
8 Chinese. After Labuan became a federal territory in 1983, the electoral 
boundaries were again shifted to give 18 Muslim, 20 non-Muslim, 8 Chinese 
and 2 mixed seats. 
There is little doubt that the most recent delineation exercise favored 
the ruling BN coalition, in particular Sabah UMNO. 26 of the 48 seats were 
now Muslim-dominated. Since 26 seats constitute more than half the seats in  
the state Legislative Assembly, the delineation ensured that the Kadazan-
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Dusun would never be in a position to challenge Muslim dominance in the 
polls. There are now only I2 Kadazan-Dusun seats compared to I8 in I994. 
The number of Chinese-dominated seats was also reduced, from 8 to 5 while 
the number of mixed seats was increased to 5. 
Another issue of concern was 'phantom voters'. According to PBS, 
about 5,000 phantom voters were prepared for the I999 polls (Borneo Post 
28 January I999). Pairin claimed illegal immigrants had registered as voters 
using the names or identity card numbers of dead locals. He claimed that 
transfer of voters en bloc without their knowledge or consent had also taken 
place. In reply, the Election Commission claimed to have struck 3,000 
names off the voting list, most as a result of PBS's complaints. Two days 
before polling, PBS filed a police report claiming that 49,270 immigrants 
had been unlawfully issued with blue Malaysian identity cards to enable 
them to vote (Borneo Post I I March 1999). No action was taken by the 
Election Commission. 
There was strong anecdotal evidence to support the PBS' s claim. In 
the four-year period leading to the polls, the number of voters had increased 
by about I25,000. The government-controlled compulsory Employees 
Provident Fund (EPF) had admitted the existence of I4,000 illegal 
immigrants with EPF accounts. 1 1  After the elections, the police confirmed 
that they had arrested four Filipinos who tried to vote in Penampang and two 
Bugis in Bingkor (Daily Express 23 March I999). In other incidents, another 
nine suspected Filipinos were prevented from voting in the southern coastal 
area of Kuala Penyu ( The Star I5 March I999). 
'Katak': The Political Frog 
By the time the election was called in late February I999, the political 
landscape had changed considerably due to the movements of the political 
'kataks'(i.e. politicians who hop from one party to another, like a frog). In 
Sabah politics, moving from one party to another is common-place, so 
common that an assemblyman, Abdul Malek Chua, had written a book 
entitled 'YB For Sale',12 which criticized party defections. Chua was writing 
from experience: he had been in Berjaya, USNO and Sabah UMNO before 
joining PBS. Defections are common, despite the existence of an anti-hop 
provision (Section I8 (2) (d)) of the Sabah state Constitution; the Kota 
Kinabalu High Court had ruled it to be ultra vires Section I 0 of the federal 
constitution in I993. 
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The three main Kadazan-Dusun parties in the Sabah BN (PDS, PBRS 
and AK.AR) were all formed by PBS defectors. Eleven state assemblymen 
of the Parti Demokratik Sabah (PDS), headed by Chief Minister Bernard 
Dompok, were all elected on a PBS ticket in 1994. The situation is similar in 
PBRS. The entire SAPP elected leadership comprises PBS defectors. 
Jumping from one BN component party to another was a common 
occurrence after 1994. For example, in October 1997 state assemblyman 
Adib Said Besar Sigoh suddenly left Sabah UMNO and joined the Kadazan­
Dusun-based PBRS. In November 1988, the top LDP Youth and Women 
leaders defected to SAPP (Daily Express 11 November 1998). A month 
earlier, more than a thousand LDP members in Tawau defected en masse to 
SAPP (Daily Express 5 October 1998). 
The more prominent Kataks prior to the elections are listed below: 
• Jeffrey Kitingan, younger brother of Pairin, left PBS in 1994 to help 
form the PBRS but subsequently joined AKAR (he has since 
returned to the PBS fold after losing a power struggle in AKAR). 
• Mark Koding, the founder of AK.AR, quit the party to rejoin the 
opposition PBS; a year earlier, Koding and Jeffrey Kitingan had lost 
the reins of AK.AR to Pandikar Amin Mulia (Daily Express 23 
March 1988) (Pandikar himself was a former vice-president of PBS). 
• Clarence Bongkos Malakun, a PBS strongman stood as an 
independent against PBS in 1994, but returned to PBS after a period 
of suspension. 
• The children of the late Tun Mustapha Harun. Amir Kahar, 
Badaruddin and Dayang Maimunah followed the footsteps of their 
father by joining Sabah UMNO in the early days of its expansion to 
Sabah in 1991 but their differing political affiliations were visible in 
the 1994 state election: Amir Kahar stood and won in Banggi on a 
PBS ticket, while Dayang Maimunah remained the Kudat Sabah 
UMNO division Wanita chief. Amir Kahar returned to Sabah 
UMNO soon after the 1994 election. Dayang Maimunah left Sabah 
UMNO in 1988 and stood as a candidate of Parti Barisan Rakyat 
Sabah Bersekutu (Bersekutu) in the 1999 election. 
15 
• Harris Salleh, the former president of Berjaya and Sabah chief 
minister (1976-1985), left Sabah UMNO and revived a 'mosquito' 
party, Bersekutu, for the 1999 election. 
• The Sabah MCA leader, Chau Tet On, the assemblyman for Api­
Api, was the sole MCA representative in the state Legislative 
Assembly. Chau had won the seat on a PBS ticket in the 1994 state 
election before defecting to the MCA. 
• Kong Hong Ming had stood on a Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) 
ticket in the Kudat constituency in the 1994 Sabah election, and to 
the surprise of many won the seat. He was made a state minister, but 
trouble began when he challenged party president Chong Kah Kiat 
for the LDP presidency in 1995 . After losing the fight, he left LDP 
and was dropped from the state cabinet. He joined Gerakan and was 
made Sabah Gerakan chief. Within months, he was expelled from 
Gerakan for not supporting the amendments to legislation aimed at 
transferring some of the chief minister's powers to the cabinet. 
Shortly afterwards he joined PBS, a party of which he was a member 
in the 1980s. 
Living up to its reputation as a katak's paradise, on the eve of 
nomination day, Sabah saw several dramatic defections when individuals 
found that they were not named as candidates. The most sensational of these 
was Tanjung Aru Sabah UMNO division chief Y ahya Lampong. He defected 
to Bersekutu when told he was not Sabah UMNO's choice, was named as a 
Bersekutu candidate, then changed his mind twenty-four hours later and 
_moved back into Sabah UMNO; his explanation: 'temporary insanity'. 
Other prominent defectors on the eve of nomination were: Ansari 
Abdullah, a deputy UMNO division chief, and Abdillah Haji Hamid, a 
former federal deputy minister, who both shifted from Sabah UMNO to 
Bersekutu. Five other Sabah UMNO members defected on nomination day, 
standing as either candidates for the opposition or as independents. All were 
later expelled from Sabah UMNO. 
More than 900 Bersekutu members in Sandakan and Tawau had left 
en masse to join the Sabah Progressive Party (SAPP) forty-eight hours 
before nomination day. 
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Ang Lian Hai moved into PBS when he was selected as the PBS 
candidate in the Chinese-majority Tanjung Papat seat. Ang, however, was 
better known as a DAP man, having contested on that party's ticket three 
times before, including once for a parliamentary seat. The former Sabah 
DAP secretary joined PBS only on the eve of the dissolution of the state 
Legislative Assembly on 22 February. 
There were further defections on the eve of polling. The most 
prominent of these was Lawrence Gimbang, the deputy speaker of the Sabah 
Legislative Assembly during the nine-year PBS rule, who pledged bis 
support to Sabah BN. It would appear that Gimbang decided to jump when 
he was passed over for the Bingkor seat. Pairin's younger brother Jeffrey 
was nominated as the PBS candidate despite strong lobbying by Gimbang. 
He obviously timed his defection to create maximum damage to Jeffrey's 
chances. Jeffrey nevertheless won. 
STATE OF THE PARTIES 
The Barisan Nasional 
The state election was originally scheduled for the second half of 1998. The 
Sabah BN bad already conducted three election 'dry runs' in June, October 
and November 1997 and the electoral machinery was put on alert from 
January 1998. The dry runs indicated that Sabah BN would win at least 26 
seats, mostly in the Muslim areas. The election was, however, postponed 
until early 1999 for to two principal reasons. 
First, the Kadazan-Dusun BN parties were weak on the ground. 
Feedback from the election dry runs suggested that the Kadazan-Dusun 
voters still preferred PBS and that the Kadazan-Dusun BN components 
(PDS, PBRS and AKAR) were fighting against each other on the ground 
instead of working together. Mahathir tried to solve this problem by 
proposing that all the Kadazan-Dusun BN parties merge into a single entity 
(Daily Express 8 April 1997, 21 November 1996). However, this was flatly 
rejected by leaders from PDS, AKAR and PBRS. The party leaders knew 
that any merger would mean that two of them would no- longer be party 
leader and would therefore be out of the race for the non-Muslim bumiputera 
chief minister slot under the rotation system. 
Secondly, seat allocation became a major obstacle due to the large 
number of BN component parties. With forty-eight seats to be shared by nine 
parties, coming to some sort of agreement was near impossible. This was 
especially true of Kadazan-Dusun constituencies where PDS, PBRS and 
17 
AKAR were all claiming to be the true representatives of the Kadazan­
Dusun community in government. 
At an early stage, Sabah UMNO asked for 25 seats (or all the Muslim 
constituencies). Among the Kadazan-Dusun parties, PDS asked for 14 seats, 
PBRS 5 and AKAR 4. Among the Chinese-based parties, SAPP wanted at 
least 8, LDP 4, and Sabah MCA 2 (Daily Express 18 June 1998). Sabah 
Gerakan and Sabah MIC, knowing their minuscule strength on the ground, 
did not ask for any seats but instead asked for a nominated state 
assemblyman slot, senatorial posts and more seats on the local councils. 13 
On the eve of the election, the Sabah BN was able to settle the 
candidacy of only 45 of the 48 constituencies (Daily Express 23 February 
1999). The other three seats were the subject of dispute among the parties 
until the final decision was made by Mahathir and Abdullah Badawi. The 
final seat distribution was: Sabah UMNO 24, PDS 12, SAPP 5,  LDP, AKAR 
and PBRS 2 each, and Sabah MCA 1. 
Sabah UMNO 
Sabah UMNO had a turbulent time prior to the polls.14 There was serious 
infighting amongst the various factions. In December 1996, Abdul Ghapur 
Salleh, one of its most senior members, resigned suddenly as deputy chief 
minister, state finance minister and Sabah UMNO deputy chairman. But he 
withdrew his resignation from the three posts the following month after 
Mahathir refused to accept it. When Dompok took over as chief minister in 
May 1988, Ghapur declined reappointment to the state cabinet. The posts of 
deputy chief minister and finance minister were taken over by Osu Sukam, 
who quit the Land and Co-operative Development portfolio at the federal 
level. It appeared that Ghapur had lost out in his power struggle with Osu's 
faction. The fight between Ghapur and Osu was the most public among the 
many factional fights as the party headed towards the election. Many Sabah 
UMNO heavyweights were trying to position themselves as leader of Sabah 
UMNO because they knew that it was Sabah UMNO' s tum to be the chief 
minister after Dompok; the non-Muslim bumiputera term of office was to 
end in May 2000. 
When Anwar Ibrahim was sacked as deputy prime minister in 
September 1998, there were fears that this would cause a split in Sabah 
UMNO as many of its leaders were known to be close to Anwar. Anwar had 
played two crucial roles in Sabah politics. The first was the dissolution of 
18 
USNO in favor of Sabah UMNO. He worked out the various arrangement 
whereby former USNO leaders would take up leadership positions in Sabah 
UMNO. The second crucial role came in the 1994 Sabah election. Mahathir 
delegated much of his authority as BN chairman to Anwar for the election. It 
was Anwar who controlled the funds that were used in that election and he 
had a major input in the selection of candidates. He also played a crucial 
role in enticing several PBS assemblymen to defect shortly after PBS had 
won the elections, causing the downfall of the newly re-elected PBS 
government. 
The fears were largely unfounded as many of pro-Anwar Sabah 
UMNO members simply transferred their loyalty to Mahathir. Like all 
politicians, they knew their political future lay with Mahathir. Almost all 
pro-Anwar candidates were renominated so that they did not bolt from the 
party to run as independents or oppositionists. 
There was also a rift between the Murut and Bajau Muslims and the 
Malay Muslims in Sabah UMNO. The Malay Muslims were irked when 
some Bajau and Murut Muslims in Sabah UMNO began to describe 
themselves as 'Malays' in front of federal UMNO leaders. The Sabah 
Malays feel that they share a special bond with the peninsular Malays and 
since UMNO stood for Malay nationalism and Islam, being a pure Malay 
was a positive factor in internal UMNO politics. 
LDP 
The Liberal Democratic Party was in turmoil for most of the second half of 
1998. LDP president Senator Chong Kah Kiat caused an uproar when he 
placed his brother-in-law, Lee Chuen Wan, and sister, Naomi Chong (Lee's 
wife), in charge of the LDP Sembulan Division. This irked Joseph Tham, a 
close aide of Chong, who candidly accused Chong of nepotism. Tham and 
twenty-eight others resigned on 7 July. Further trouble occurred when 
Chong's confidential secretary, Roger Lee, was forced to resign when the 
party's supreme council moved to sack him as LDP Youth chief and dissolve 
his Api-Api division along with eight branches (The Star 18 July 1998). 
Many senior party members were unhappy when Chong decided to give up 
his ministership in the federal government to fight for the Kudat state 
constituency. This move deprived others of the chance to move forward. 
Many thought that Chong should be content with his senatorial post and let 
others contest the Kudat seat. 
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Earlier, in 1995 , the LDP suffered a major fracture when Chong was 
challenged for the presidency of the party by Kong Hong Ming. Kong was 
the only successful LDP candidate in the 1994 state polls and he felt that he 
should be party leader instead of Chong who was not elected. The bitter 
struggle ended when Kong lost the internal party vote. Kong subsequently 
left the party with many of his supporters and rejoined PBS. 
The Kadazan-Dusun Parties 
The major problem facing the BN Kadazan-Dusun parties, PDS, PBRS and 
A.KAR, was a lack of political legitimacy. The entire elected leadership of 
these three parties was elected as PBS candidates in 1994. The three party 
leaders knew that their claim to represent the Kadazan-Dusun community 
sounded hollow. This was especially so after all PDS and PBRS candidates 
were defeated by PBS candidates in the 1995 parliamentary polls. One 
suggestion, as mentioned above, was the amalgamation of all three, or at 
least PDS and PBRS, into a single BN Kadazan-Dusun party. This was 
rejected out of hand by the party leaders, who did not want their chance of 
becoming the non-Muslim bumiputera chief minister diminished. PBRS and 
A.KAR leaders, moreover, knew that PDS was in a stronger position than 
they in any merger. In terms of numbers, PDS had eleven assemblymen 
while PBRS had only two and AKAR three. 
The Parti Demokratik Sabah (PDS) was caught in a war of words with 
PBS for most of the year preceding the elections (See Borneo Post and Daily 
Express various issues 1-15 July 1997). PDS President Bernard Dompok had 
always maintained that the formation of PDS had the personal blessing of 
PBS President Joseph Pairin and he further claimed that Pairin had 
personally chosen the party name PDS. According to Dompok, Pairin helped 
establish PDS just after the collapse of the PBS government in 1994 because 
he wanted to ensure that the Kadazan-Dusun community was represented in 
a future BN-led state government. Pairin denied this and claimed that 
Dompok was merely trying to use the PBS to legitimize the formation of 
PDS. 
A.KAR had the greatest internal problems among the BN Kadazan­
Dusun parties leading up to the polls. In 1996, there was an acrimonious 
battle between Jeffrey Kitingan and Pandikar Amin Haji Mulia over the 
leadership of the party after Mark Kading, the party founder and leader, 
announced that he was quitting. Koding backed Jeffrey as his successor but 
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Amin cried foul, claiming that Jeffrey was nothing more than an opportunist 
'katak'; Jeffrey had joined AKAR after an unsuccessful attempt at forming 
his own party. Pandikar eventually won the struggle and Jeffrey left with his 
supporters, first declaring himself as a 'BN independent', then rejoining the 
opposition PBS in 1997. 
In the 1999 election, AKAR's leader Pandikar Amin did not contest, 
giving way to a Sabah UMNO candidate in return for a senatorship15 and a 
post in the federal cabinet. 
The other Sabah BN parties - SAPP and PBRS - enjoyed relative 
calm before the election. SAPP was firmly under the leadership of Yong 
Teck Lee, while friction in PBRS was at a minimum given that it had only 




The opposition was less divided than the Sabah BN. PBS was united under 
Pairin; the only doubt was whether PBS was going to fight the election alone 
or in coalition with other opposition parties. Parti Bersekutu under Harris 
made some overtures to PBS but Pairin firmly rejected any pact with Harris 
or any other opposition party, although there was a discreet understanding 
that Bersekutu and PBS would avoid attacking each other and concentrate on 
the Sabah BN. 
One source of tension in the PBS was the issue of kataks returning 
into the PBS fold. There was widespread resentment against former PBS 
members who returned to the party after joining Sabah BN. Pairin's brother, 
Jeffrey Kitingan, bore the brunt of the resentment inside PBS against the 
returnees. Many in the party did not want him back as he was the most high­
profile PBS assemblyman to defect after the 1994 polls. This was made very 
clear when Jeffrey failed in his bid to win the vice president's post at the 
twelfth PBS congress (Daily Express 26 September 97). 16 
Karamunting state assemblyman Lau Pui Keong left the PBS and 
declared himself to be an independent in 1997. Lau, a former Berjaya state 
assemblyman and Sabah' s longest serving Chinese assemblyman, could not 
get along with Pairin after he accused the latter of promoting Kadazan­
Dusun rights at the expense of the Chinese community. Lau stepped down 
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from his position as PBS vice president and, knowing that he would 
probably be defeated as an independent, did not stand for re-election in 
1999. Another senior Chinese PBS figure, deputy president Wong Ping 
Chung, was also known to be unhappy with the PBS leadership prior to the 
polls. Wong was the Kudat assemblyman but was defeated by BN-LDP's 
Kong Hong Ming in the 1994 election. Kong later defected to PBS and was 
made the p::rty's candidate in Kudat for the 1999 election. Wong wanted to 
contest the Kudat seat but was willing to settle for the Inanam seat if given 
the chance. He got neither and blamed Pairin for it. 
Parti Bersekutu 
Parti Bersekutu burst onto the public stage amidst much fanfare. Its 
flamboyant leader, Harris Salleh, attracted attention early when he promised 
that, if elected, he would distribute :MR.300 to every adult Sabahan from the 
Amanah Rakyat Negri Sabah (ARNS) (Sabah People's Trust). This was a 
practice started in the early 1970s by Mustapha Harun. Just before every 
election, Mustapha would hand out 'dividends' from the Yayasan Sabah 
(Sabah Foundation) to every adult Sabahan registered on the electoral roll. It 
was nothing more than a cash bribe and was very successful in enticing the 
voters to vote for USNO. It was obvious that Harris wanted to re-use a tried­
and-tested method to entice the voters. 
Parti Bersekutu also managed to attract media attention when former 
leaders of Parti Bersekutu claimed that Harris' s take-over of the party was 
' illegal'. This went on for several weeks until Harris managed to get 
confirmation of his position as acting president of the party from the 
registrar of societies (Borneo Post 10 October 1998). On 15 January 1999, 
six weeks before the election, Harris met secretly with Mahathir in Kuala 
Lumpur. It is almost certain that Mahathir asked Harris to withdraw from the 
election while Harris was thought to have asked for Bersekutu to be made a 
component party of the BN (Daily Express 21 January 1999). No deal was 
struck. 
Harris was clearly confident about Bersekutu' s chances, having 
finalized the list of candidates as early as mid-February 1999, earlier than 
any other political party (Borneo Post 25 February 1999). 
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Sabah DAP 
The main Chinese opposition, the Sabah Democratic Action Party (DAP), 
remained silent for most of the year preceding the election. The Sabah DAP 
was at a low ebb because the man known as 'Mr Sabah DAP', Fung Ket 
Wing, was no longer in the party. DAP expelled Fung in 1988 when he tried 
to overthrow DAP leader Lim Kit Siang. Several other Sabah DAP leaders 
had also abandoned the party. Ang Lian Hai, former Sabah DAP secretary 
and three-time DAP candidate, left to become a PBS candidate. Samson 
Chin, a former Sabah DAP :MF, also became a PBS candidate. 
Despite this, Lim Kit Siang, the national DAP leader, openly backed 
the PBS. The reasons were fairly obvious: DAP wanted the BN defeated and 
knew that PBS stood a real chance of winning the election. Furthermore, in 
the 1990 parliamentary election, the DAP had had an unofficial pact with the 
PBS when it withdrew from the Chinese seats and backed the PBS 
candidates instead. 
Minor Parties 
The minor opposition parties that took part in the elections were Pasok, Setia 
and PAS. The Pertubuhan Kebangsaan Pasok Nunukragang Bersatu (Pasok) 
was one of the oldest political parties in Sabah. Its members comprised 
mainly Kadazan-Dusun and Murut and the party claimed to have 12,000 
members (though this was almost certainly a highly inflated number). Pasok, 
which won the Moyog seat in the 1985 state election, 17 did not participate in 
the 1994 state election. In early February 1999, it announced that it would 
field fourteen candidates. A few days before nomination day, however, it 
said it was pulling out of the election and was supporting Sabah BN instead. 
In a surprising twist of events, Pasok sprang a surprise in Moyog when it 
fielded its president, Cleftus Sipain Mojingol, against the BN chief minister, 
Bernard Dompok (Daily Express 3 March 1999). 
Another minor party, Parti Demokratik Setia-Sehati Kuasa Rakyat 
Bersatu Sabah (Setia), decided to field twenty-one candidates in the 1999 
election. In the 1994 elections, Setia contested and lost in all fourteen 
constituencies. 
PAS's entry into Sabah politics was mainly to 'fly its flag' and lay the 
groundwork for future elections. It needed to field some candidates to show 
that it was serious about entering Sabah politics for the long term and had 
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support among the local Muslim population. In reality, the party had little 
support in Sabah; its ideological goal of creating an Islamic state had little 
appeal even among the radical Sabah Muslims. PAS' s earlier forays into 
Sabah elections had all been disastrous, with many of its candidates losing 
their electoral deposits. 18 Nevertheless, the party had hoped to capitalize on 
the Anwar Ibrahim issue and fielded six candidates. All six lost. 
THE CAMPAIGN 
Prior to the dissolution of the state assembly, Sabah BN held 43 of 48 seats. 
Sabah UMNO had the most seats (21) followed by PDS 11, SAPP 5 ,  AKAR 
3,  PBRS 2, MCA 1, PBS 4 and independents 1. Sabah UMNO had two 
nominated assemblymen with another vacancy following the death of Pitting 
Ali from Sabah UMNO. Three nominated assemblymen were from the 
PBS. 19 
The Sabah State Legislative Assembly was formally dissolved on 22 
February, twenty-four days short of completing its five-year term. 
Nomination day was 2 March and polling for Sabah' s ninth election took 
place on 12-13 March 1999. No doubt the ten-day campaign period, a day 
shorter than in the 1994 election campaign, was designed to benefit the 
ruling BN at the expense of the opposition. Although formal campaigning 
was restricted to the ten day period, in reality all the parties had been 
campaigning since early January 1998. So, in effect, this election saw the 
longest period - fourteen months - of campaigning. 
BN, PBS and Bersekutu had candidates in all the 48 constituencies. 
Parti Setia nominated 21 candidates, PAS 6 and Pasok 1 while 27 contestants 
stood as independents, making a total of 199 candidates. 
'Building the Future Together' and the bait 
The BN campaign, as in previous elections, was based on a mixture of 
threats and promises. The manifesto, entitled Building the Future Together, 
pledged to steer Sabah' s economy to greater heights through generous 
financial support from the federal government. Its promises could only be 
filled if the BN was allowed to complete its 1995 -2010 long-term 
development agenda, that is, if it could get elected. The BN promised to 
continue the rotation system because the BN believed in 'sharing power'. It 
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made it clear that if the BN lost the election there was 'no way' PBS or 
Bersekutu would be admitted into the BN to form a coalition government. 
This was repeated many times by Mahathir personally; he vowed that an 
opposition government would not get any additional financial support from 
the federal government: 
'We are not being unfair . . .  we are more fair than them [the 
opposition] but we cannot be generous to them. We can be 
generous to a BN government in Sabah and that I can 
promise' (Daily Express 11 March 1999). 
In sum, the BN promised economic development and continuity if 
elected, and threatened political instability and economic stagnation if 
rejected. 
Among major government projects and grants (bribes thinly disguised 
as 'development'), dished out during the campaign were: 
• RM24 million for minor projects in all 48 constituencies. Each 
constituency was to receive RMS00,000 in addition to the RM4 
million grant from the federal government for minor rural projects. 
According to Second Finance Minister Mustapa Mohamed, only BN 
assemblymen could use the money. For constituencies not 
represented by BN assemblymen, the grants would be handled by 
BN representatives (New Straits Times 17 December 1998). 
• RMl 1 2.9  million to rid Sabah of abject poverty (Borneo Post 29 
January 1999). 
• Four new fire and rescue stations in Sabah by end of 2000 (Borneo 
Post 6 March 1999). 
• Construction of a 60km road linking Merotai to Kalabakan in 
southeast Sabah, costing about RM80 million (ibid.). 
• A RM50 million Royal Malaysia Navy (RMN) forward base in 
Semporna and a RM700 million Second Regional Marine Command 
in Sepanggar Bay in Kata Kinabalu (Daily Express 7 March 1999). 
• Six hospitals in Sabah, costing RM590 million, under the Seventh 
Malaysian Plan. In addition, a new RM208 million Specialist 
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Hospital would be built for Lahad Datu (Daily Express 5 March 
1999). 
• A new Mara Junior Science College (MRSM) in Kinarut and a new 
Mara Skills Training Institute (IKM) in Menggatal, to cost RM46 
million and RM44 million respectively (Daily Express 27 February 
1999). 
• A RM800 million allocation to Universiti Sabah Malaysia (USM). 
According to Mahathir, this proved the federal government's 'love' 
for the people of Sabah, because even the long-established Universiti 
Utara Malaysia in his own constituency of Kubang Pasu had secured 
only RM400 million (Daily Express 6 March 1999). 
• A RM200,000 allocation from the federal government to the Kota 
Kinabalu Municipal Council (KKMC) to upgrade facilities and settle 
problems at the central market (Daily Express 8 March 1999). 
• RM4 million for twenty Chinese schools in Kota Kinabalu (Borneo 
Post 12 March 1999). 
• A RM2 million chair in Kadazan-Dusun studies at Universiti 
Malaysia Sabah (UMS). 
For the selected examples given above, BN promised more than 
RM2.6 billion in projects and grants if elected. Given that there were 
726,690 potential voters, this worked out at about RM3 , 5 00 in 
'development' for every Sabah voter. 
Sabah BN used Islam blatantly to sway the Muslim vote. In a speech 
before a gathering of the state's Islamic officials and missionaries, Sabah 
Deputy Chief Minister Osu Sukam stated that it was fardhu kifayah (social 
obligation) for Muslims to vote in a BN government because BN was led by 
Muslims and Islam could only flourish under Muslim (read UMNO-led) rule 
(Osu was no doubt referring to PBS being led by Pairin, a Roman Catholic) 
(Daily Express 6 March 1999). This message was repeated in all the Muslim 
areas. 
To blunt PBS' s strong Kadazan-Dusun credentials, the BN Kadazan­
Dusun parties tried to gain political mileage from several highly publicized 
communal events. These included the state government-funded RM2 million 
chair in Kadazan-Dusun studies at UMS, the introduction of Kadazan as a 
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Pupil-Own-Language (POL) in primary schools throughout the state, and the 
setting up of a Kadazan-Dusun Chamber of Commerce to promote Kadazan­
Dusun equity in government contracts. The BN Kadazan-Dusun parties 
claimed that if PBS won power the Kadazan-Dusun community would be 
'finished', as there would be no Kadazan-Dusun representatives in 
government. Dompok upped the stakes when he announced that he would 
quit politics if defeated. 
The BN Kadazan-Dusun parties spent a considerable amount of time 
attacking Pairin's status as Huguan Siou, or paramount leader of the 
Kadazan-Dusuns. They claimed that Pairin was politicizing a title that was 
merely a cultural symbol. The Huguan Siou title was Pairin's strongest claim 
to be the legitimate leader of the Kadazan-Dusun community, and many 
Kadazan-Dusun voters had voted for PBS solely because of Pairin's status as 
their paramount leader. This attack on Pairin was counter-productive, merely 
reinforcing Pairin' s image as the legitimate paramount leader of the 
community. 
To counter the PBS' s claim that all BN Kadazan-Dusun candidates 
were 'traitors' and kataks, Dayak leaders were brought in from neighboring 
Sarawak. Parti Bansa Dayak Sarawak (PBDS) leader Leo Moggie's brief 
was to show the futility of staying in opposition. PBDS and PBS had much 
in common; both represented the main indigenous groups in their respective 
states. PBDS fights for indigenous Dayak rights in Sarawak; in opposition 
against the Sarawak BN from 1987 until 1994, the PBDS was unable to 
bring any government development into rural Dayak constituencies, PBDS 
opted to rejoin the Sarawak BN (Chin 1996a). Leo Moggie's message was 
simple: the rights of the Kadazan-Dusun are best looked after within the BN 
and this was the lesson learnt by PBDS. BN Kadazan-Dusun leaders were 
not 'traitors' by joining BN but were in BN to bring development to their 
people (Daily Express 6, 7 March 1999). 
In the Chinese areas, SAPP, LDP and Sabah MCA constantly 
reminded the Chinese community that political stability and their economic 
prosperity was tied to a BN victory. The Chinese voters were told that the 
only way an ethnic Chinese, as a member of a minority, could become chief 
minister was under the BN' s rotation system. Comparison was made with 
the plight of the Indonesian Chinese to stress the importance of political 
stability and Chinese representation in government.20 Mahathir personally 
praised the role of the Sabah Chinese business community and promised that 
there would be more business opportunities if BN were elected.21 
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More than RM6 million was distributed to Chinese schools throughout 
Sabah. The Sabah Chinese community, like their counterparts in Peninsular 
Malaysia, are supportive of Chinese education and have generously 
supported the independent Chinese schools since independence. In the 1994 
election, the BN was able to win over a substantial number of Chinese voters 
when the then deputy prime minister, Anwar Ibrahim, gave RM30 million to 
Chinese schools in Sabah a few days before polling day. The Sabah BN was 
obviously hoping for a repeat performance. 
The importance of the Sabah campaign for the federal government 
was underlined not only by the funds committed but also by the number of 
federal ministers involved. The key federal person in charge of the campaign 
was Abdullah Badawi, the newly appointed deputy prime minister. Abdullah 
made four visits to Sabah (within the space of two months) prior to the 
election and he stayed in Sabah throughout the campaign. Another key 
federal player was the menteri-besar of Pahang, Khalil Yaakob, who took 
six weeks special leave to serve as operations director for the entire BN 
campaign. Khalil was a man with seemingly unlimited financial resources.22 
In many Sabah UMNO constituencies, it was UMNO personnel from the 
peninsula who took charge of logistics. Thousands of peninsula UMNO 
campaigners were used under the 'adoption' concept. Under this, UMNO 
branches from the peninsula 'adopted' individual Sabah UMNO branches 
and divisions and helped with campaign funds, materials, logistic support 
and personnel. There were credible reports of widespread vote buying by the 
Sabah BN.23 Voters in several key marginal seats were given RM$50 on 
polling day. Although the PBS also gave voters food and materials as 
inducements, their level of spending was nowhere near what the Sabah BN 
spent in the election. A conservative estimate put Sabah BN spending at 
close to RM300 million for the entire election. 24 
Mahathir himself made four visits to Sabah, including a whirlwind 
tour of half a dozen marginal seats one day before polling. All the federal 
ministers, menteri-besar, and chief ministers from the other states were 
roped in for the campaign. Over one hundred 'field information officers' 
from the national Information Department were sent to Sabah to drum up 
support. In the rural interior, the ability to use government helicopters gave 
the BN a distinct advantage. 25 
It goes without saying that the BN campaign enjoyed the benefits of 
the BN' s being the incumbent. The BN had unparalleled access to the state­
owned radio and television stations. The two private television stations, TV3 
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and Channel 7, were owned by individuals close to UMNO, and their 
reporting reflected this. 
'United to Save Sabah ' and Kadazan-Dusun Nationalism 
PBS' s manifesto, United to Save Sabah, gave a broad outline of the party's 
political, economic, socio-cultural and institutional objectives. The 
manifesto elaborated at length the party's achievements when it was in power 
from 1985 to 1994 and detailed the many broken promises of the BN 
government. The main thrust of the manifesto was to: 
• restore the ' rights' of Sabah as enshrined in the Twenty-Points; 
• abolish the rotation of the chief minister's post; 
• formulate a new anti-hop law; 
• restore the constitutional and legal powers of the chief minister. 
As in its previous manifestos, PBS promised to find a solution to the 
illegal Filipino immigrant and fake identity card problems. 
One interesting omission from the PBS manifesto was any reference 
to Labuan. PBS had harped on the Labuan issue at every election since 1984. 
In this election PBS decided not to raise the Labuan issue in order to protect 
Bersekutu. Bersekutu was led by Harris Salleh, the former chief minister 
who had signed Labuan away to the federal government. Raising the Labuan 
issue would hurt Harris, now a foe of the BN. Bersekutu was expected to 
draw Muslim votes away from the BN and no doubt this would benefit PBS. 
At the grassroots level, the main emphasis in PBS' s campaign was on 
ensuring that state rights under the Twenty-Points were respected; scrapping 
the rotation system; a new 'anti-hop' law, and 'positive revenge' on PBS 
kataks. PBS claimed, with some justification, that rotating the chief 
ministership every two years was disruptive, wasteful and inefficient. 
'Positive revenge' was the term coined by Pairin when he asked voters to 
reject all BN candidates who had won on a PBS ticket but crossed over to 
the BN (Daily Express 24 February 1999). The list was long (twenty-one); 
practically all the BN candidates in the non-Muslim constituencies had won 
their seats on a PBS ticket in 1994. The main targets for the PBS leadership 
were the main BN Kadazan-Dusun leaders such as Dompok of PDS and 
Kurup of PBRS. Pairin spent a considerable amount of time campaigning 
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against these two personally. Pairin understood the importance of defeating 
the two party leaders so that they could not claim to represent the Kadazan­
Dusun. 
In the Kadazan-Dusun areas, PBS made a successful call for Kadazan­
Dusun unity and nationalism, arguing that the BN Kadazan-Dusun parties 
could not protect and promote the interests of the community as the 
government was dominated by Sabah UMNO, a party that promoted only 
Muslims and the Malay race. BN Kadazan-Dusun leaders were singled out 
for 'selling out' their race and religion. 
PBS also campaigned heavily on the fact that it was truly multi­
religious, with strong Christian representation and some Muslim support, 
unlike Sabah BN which was clearly dominated by Muslims. In previous 
elections, PBS had obtained votes from the Christian community who were 
worried about increasing Islamization. 
Bersekutu's Promises 
Bersekutu made a list of seemingly impossible promises during the election 
campaign. In addition to the RM300 cash grant to every Sabahan adult, the 
other notable promises included: 
• a female Chinese state minister (there has never been a Chinese 
woman minister in the Sabah cabinet and this promise was obviously 
aimed at the Chinese female voting population) (Daily Express 5 
March 1999); 
• land for squatters; 
• a private university, called, 'Universiti Yayasan Sabah' in 
Kundasang (Daily Express 25 February 1999); 
• forcing the federal government to hand over billions 'owed' to Sabah 
since 1964 according to a formula in the federal constitution (Borneo 
Post 8 March 1999). 
Harris tried his best to project Bersekutu as the party for Sabah 
Muslims, as opposed to Sabah UMNO which he tried, unsuccessfully, to 
portray as a ' semenanjung '  (peninsular) Muslim party. In one famous 
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remark, he claimed that he could easily win the Likas seat simply because 
the Muslims there would vote for him! (Sabah Times 8 March 1999) 
Many of the party's promises were not taken seriously by the 
electorate when it became obvious that the sums promised far exceeded 
anything an opposition state government could deliver. They were simply 
too far-fetched. It was clear early on that Bersekutu was not a credible threat. 
Harris Salleh was still largely unforgiven for handing Labuan Island over to 
the federal government. His insistence that he too was for Sabah rights 
sounded hollow given his record in office. Mahathir' s television interview in 
which he said that Harris had given Labuan to the federal government on a 
'silver platter' damaged the party irrevocably (Daily Express 12 March 
1999). 
Another event from Harris' s past which caused grave political damage 
was an oil agreement signed by Harris in 1976, as chief minister, in which 
Sabah gave up rights to petroleum found in the state to the national oil 
corporation, Petroliam Nasional Berhad (Petronas). Under the agreement, 
Sabah received a paltry 5 per cent of the state's oil royalties while 95 per cent 
went to the federal government's coffers. Many Sabahans regard this as 
another example of Harris 'selling out' Sabah. The BN took great pleasure in 
revealing that another signatory to the oil agreement was Pairin Kitingan, 
and that it was hypocritical of Harris and Pairin to claim that they were 
fighting for state rights. Pairin' s plausible defense was that as an assistant 
minister in 1976, he signed the agreement merely as a witness under direct 
orders from Harris (Daily Express 9 February 1999). The only issue on 
which PBS and Bersekutu were in agreement was the 'rotation' system: like 
PBS, Bersekutu promised to scrap the system once in power. 
THE RESULTS 
Voting, as expected, was along ethnic/religious lines. The BN took 31 seats 
with Sabah UMNO winning all the allocated seats (24), SAPP (3 of 5 
allocated seats) and LDP (2 of 2). The BN Kadazan-Dusun parties were 
decimated. PDS was able to win only 2 of 12 contested seats while all the 
candidates from PBRS and AKAR were defeated at the hands of PBS 
candidates. 
The PBS took the other 17 seats. All other parties were crushed at the 
polls. With the exception of a few Bersekutu candidates, all the other 
candidates lost their electoral deposits, indicating their dismal support. 26 
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Although the BN had a working majority of six seats, this was still 
short of the all important two-thirds majority needed to amend the Sabah 
Constitution. This was quickly solved when BN exercised its right to appoint 
six nominated state assemblymen; this brought the BN majority to 12 seats 
and gave it a two-thirds majority in the state assembly. 
Overall, the BN got 46.4 per cent of the vote, followed closely by PBS 
with 41.2 per cent. Bersekutu came a distant third with a mere 10. 5  per cent 
(see Table 2). Essentially, Sabah UMNO took the Muslim vote, and PBS the 
non-Muslim bumiputera vote, while the Chinese vote was complex. 
Ironically, for a party that claimed to target the Muslims, Bersekutu 
performed better in Chinese-majority constituencies than Muslim-majority 
constituencies (this of course does not mean that Bersekutu won Chinese 
votes). The voter turnout was 72.5  per cent of the 726,690 eligible voters. 
The Muslim Vote 
Sabah UMNO clearly led the Muslim vote. With the exception of Labuk and 
Kunak, it won all the 26 Muslim-majority constituencies.27 In terms of 
percentage, Sabah UMNO was able to get 52.6 per cent of the vote in the 
Muslim constituencies while PBS was able to get a respectable 3 1.7 per cent. 
Most of PBS's vote in the Muslim seats came from Kadazan-Dusun voters, 
though it received some Muslim votes. Bersekutu' s appeal to the Muslim 
community came to nothing and they were able to get only 13 .1  per cent of 
the vote. Harris himself lost in a Muslim seat (Likas) to an ethnic Chinese 
BN candidate. 
PAS, as expected, performed poorly and received a total of less than 
1,500 votes in all the six constituencies it contested. Clearly the Sabah 
Muslims did not like PAS' s fiery brand of radical Islam. PAS' s raising of the 
Anwar Ibrahim issue did not make any impact on the Muslim electorate, 
suggesting that the Anwar issue was seen as a 'peninsular' issue with no 
ramifications for local Sabah politics. This was confirmed when Abdul 
Rahman Yaakub of PBS was heavily defeated by a BN candidate in the 
Klias constituency. Rahman Y aakub was a close ally of Anwar and Wan 
Azizah Wan Ismail, Anwar' s wife, had helped him to campaign. 
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The Non-Muslim bumiputera Vote 
PBS dominated the non-Muslim bumiputera, predominantly Kadazan­
Dusun, vote the way Sabah UMNO dominated the Muslim vote. This was 
best symbolized by the disastrous defeat of all BN Kadazan-Dusun parties. 
The incumbent chief minister and PDS leader, Bernard Dompok,28 was 
defeated along with the leader of PBRS and deputy chief minister, Joseph 
Kurup. Only 2 of 12 PDS candidates survived the polls. The two candidates 
each from PBRS and AK.AR lost to PBS candidates as well, leaving both 
parties with no elected representatives at all. It was clear that the 'katak' 
label spelt their political death. 
The two PDS victories, in Ranau and Kuala Penyu, were essentially 
based on Muslim votes. Kuala Penyu is a Muslim-majority seat while in 
Ranau Muslims constitute 37 .5 per cent of the voters. It is almost certain 
that the Muslims in both constituencies cast a block vote for the BN 
candidate, thus allowing the PDS candidates to win. 
The PBS domination of the non-Muslim vote can be seen in the voting 
statistics (see Table 2). PBS gathered 58 per cent of the votes in the 12 non­
Muslim bumiputera constituencies while BN managed to get only 38.4 per 
cent. Bersekutu performed poorly in the non-Muslim areas, getting an 
insignificant 3.2 per cent of the vote. 
The Chinese Vote 
The Chinese vote was perhaps the most interesting in the election. In 1994 
the Chinese vote was split between PBS and BN. This time around, it would 
appear that there was no straightforward pattern. PBS took 3 of the Chinese­
majority seats (Api-Api, Sri Tanjung and Inanam) while the BN was 
successful in the other two (Tanjung Papat and Karamunting). 
Assuming that the majority of Muslim voters in Chinese-majority 
constituencies voted for the BN, with the rest going to Bersekutu and PBS, 
the following pattern of Chinese voting emerges. 
In the Api-Api constituency, PBS managed to get 2 Chinese votes for 
every BN Chinese vote. PBS got about eight thousand Chinese votes to BN' s 
four thousand. 
In the Sri Tanjung constituency (10,513 Muslim voters; 583 non­
Muslim bumiputera; 15,747 Chinese; 136 Others), the result was: PBS 8,759 
votes; SAPP-BN 5,007 and Bersekutu 3 ,814. The Chinese vote was heavily 
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in favour of PBS .  PBS got about 85 per cent of the Chinese vote while 
Bersekutu and BN shared the other 20 percent. The Muslim vote in Sri 
Tanjung was split between BN and Bersekutu. 
In the Inanam constituency (2,716 Muslim voters; 7,628 non-Muslim 
bumiputera; 10,971 Chinese; 118 Others),  the Chinese vote was split 
between PBS and Bersekutu in a ratio of about 2: 1. The results were: PBS 
9,648; Bersekutu 4,940 and PDS-BN 1,081. 
In Tanjung Papat, the Chinese vote was split three ways between PBS, 
BN and Bersekutu. The constituency had 14,457 voters (4,317 Muslim, 265 
non-Muslim bumiputera, 9,797 Chinese, 78 Others) . The results were: 
SAPP-BN 4482 votes, PBS 2786, Bersekutu 2311. Assuming that 80 per 
cent of the SAPP-BN' s vote came from the Muslims, it is clear that the 
Chinese vote was split three ways:  almost equally between PBS and 
Bersekutu and some to SAPP-BN. This allowed the BN candidate to win. 
The result in Karamunting (5 ,087 Muslim voters; 261 non-Muslim 
bumiputera; 9,206 Chinese; 5 4  Others) was: LDP-BN 4,719 votes; PBS 
2,922; Bersekutu 2,124. It is clear that the Chinese vote was split between 
PBS and Bersekutu, allowing the BN candidate to win on a combination of 
the Muslim vote and some Chinese support. 
It could be argued that Bersekutu' s presence in all five Chinese 
constituencies served as the vote-splitter among Muslim voters.  For 
example, if there had not been Bersekutu candidates in Tanjung Papat and 
Karamunting, there is a real likelihood that PBS would have won these two 
seats. Bersekutu performed poorly among Chinese voters, in part because 
many Chinese voters still remember Harris' s role in the 1986 riots in Kota 
Kinabalu. The rioting in the capital city disrupted Chinese businesses and 
many Chinese blamed Harris .  29 The confessions of several former top 
officials of Berjaya (who were now with Bersekutu) that they were behind 
the bombing campaign and rioting caused many Chinese to vote against 
Harris and Bersekutu. 
From the above, it can be concluded that close to 70 per cent of the 
Chinese vote went to PBS while most of the remainder went to BN and a 
smaller proportion went to Bersekutu. The convoluted pattern could only be 
explained by the presence of local factors. 
In the Api-Api constituency, many Chinese voters voted for the PBS 
because the BN candidate was from Sabah MCA. Many Chinese voters were 
simply turned off by the MCA whom they regard as a lackey of UMNO and 
incapable of standing up for Chinese rights. Instead, they chose PBS,  a local 
party. National MCA leaders who campaigned in Api-Api were widely seen 
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as outsiders meddling in internal Sabah affairs and were considered arrogant 
by the locals.30 The Sabah MCA candidate, Chau Tet On, suffered from the 
katak label - Chau had won the seat earlier on a PBS ticket. Chau also 
suffered political damage when rumors circulated that some residents in the 
area would be forced to move to make way for a major tourist development; 
those residents voted against Chau. 
From the Api-Api vote it would appear that the Sabah Chinese do not 
accept Peninsular Chinese parties. Sabah Gerakan made a wise move in 
deciding not to contest the election. It is almost certain that its candidate 
would have met the same fate as the Sabah MCA candidate. 
In Sri Tanjung, the Muslim vote did not go totally to BN because the 
BN-SAPP candidate, Michael Lim Yun Sang, was unable to get the support 
of the local Sabah UMNO officials. Some Muslim Sabah UMNO supporters 
decided to vote for Bersekutu instead (personal communication from a BN 
official) .  
In the Inanam constituency, the Bersekutu candidate performed 
strongly among the Chinese voters because she was personally popular. Her 
anti-corruption platform attracted a following. The BN candidate performed 
poorly in part because she was not a Chinese. The Chinese voters simply 
refused to endorse a non-Muslim bumiputera for a Chinese seat. 
In the Tanjung Papat constituency, PBS probably lost some crucial 
Chinese votes because the party endorsed an outsider, former DAP stalwart 
Ang Lian Hai, leading to some local PBS members abstaining or voting 
against PBS.  
In Karamunting, a similar situation occurred. PBS dumped popular 
incumbent Lau Pui Keong, who had left PBS after disagreements with 
Pairin. Lau had been Karamuting' s assemblyman since 1976, having won re­
election seven times, a record. Many Chinese voters in the constituency 
consequently voted against PBS. 
Overall, PBS won the vote in the five Chinese-majority seats, with 
48.2 per cent of the votes, followed by Sabah BN with 36.4 per cent, while 
Bersekutu was a distant third with only 15 .0 per cent. 
The Mixed Constituencies 
In the mixed constituencies, BN performed marginally better than PBS .  The 
Sabah BN took 3 seats (LDP 1 ,  SAPP 1 ,  Sabah UMNO 1) while the other 2 
went to PBS. This is reflected in the voting percentages; the S abah BN took 
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45 .8  per cent of the votes in the five constituencies, followed closely by PBS 
with 43. 1  percent, and Bersekutu again a distant third with a mere 9. 1 per 
cent. Voting here was clearly along racial/religious lines .  The Muslims 
supported BN while the majority of the Chinese and Kadazan-Dusun 
supported PBS. A small minority of voters supported Bersekutu. 
It is extremely difficult, perhaps impossible, to measure the impact of 
the phantom voters. Precise figures are impossible to obtain. Unconfirmed 
reports suggest that while more than 80 per cent of the phantom voters voted 
for the Sabah BN, a small minority voted against it. Those who voted against 
the Sabah BN were angry that promises made to them in the 1994 state and 
the 1995 national parliamentary elections were not fulfilled. 31 Again, there is 
no way to verify this. 
Despite claims that the BN won an 'overwhelming majority' ,32 this 
was simply not the case. In percentage terms, more than half the Sabah 
voters rejected Sabah BN. The BN win had more to do with the 
gerrymandering of Muslim seats and the 'first-pass-the-post' electoral 
system than anything else. Sabah BN won an 'overwhelming majority' only 
among the Sabah Muslims.  The Kadazan-Dusun community clearly rejected 
the Sabah BN, and Sabah UMNO in particular. More than half of the 
Chinese voters also rejected the Sabah BN in favor of the PBS.  
There are remarkable similarities between the 1 999 vote and the 1 995 
parliamentary polls (see Table 1) .  As in 1 995, all the PBS defectors who 
stood in Kadazan-Dusun areas were defeated. In Muslim areas in 1 995, BN 
received 62.5 per cent of the vote while PBS got 36.6 per cent, in a straight 
fight between Sabah UMNO and PBS .  If we postulate that it was also a 
straight contest between Sabah UMNO and PBS in the Muslim seats in the 
1 999 Sabah polls and that Bersekutu' s voters would have voted for Sabah 
UMNO in the absence of Bersekutu, then Sabah UMNO would have 
received 65 .7 per cent of the vote to PBS' s  3 1 .7 per cent. 
This pattern is repeated in the Kadazan-Dusun areas. In 1 995,  BN 
obtained 40.7 per cent to PBS ' s  59 .1  per cent. In 1 999, BN obtained 3 8.7 per 
cent to PBS ' s  57.6 per cent. In the Chinese belt, the situation was similar. In 
1 995 ,  BN took 5 2.7 per cent to PBS ' s 42.3 per cent. In 1 999,  the 
corresponding figures were 36.4 per cent and 48.2 per cent. Assuming that 
Bersekutu' s 15 per cent vote would have gone to BN if there had been a 
straight fight between PBS and BN, then the BN vote for 1 999 would have 
been 5 1 .  7 per cent. 
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Whither Kadazan-Dusun Nationalism? 
With only two Kadazan-Dusun representatives in the Sabah BN, it was 
obvious that the next Sabah chief minister was going to be a Muslim. Strictly 
speaking, it was still the tum of the Kadazan-Dusun community under the 
rotation system. Dompok had served only 1 3  months of a 24-month 
rotational post when he was defeated. 
Given that the Kadazan-Dusun had decisively rejected the Sabah BN, 
Mahathir appointed Osu Sukam, Sabah UMNO chief, as the new chief 
minister. Mahathir, however, did promise to carry on with the rotation 
system, indicating that a Kadazan-Dusun would take over as chief minister 
after the Muslims and the Chinese. However, several Sabah Ul\1NO leaders 
have already called for a rethink on the rotation system while others are 
openly calling for the system to be discarded (Daily Express 28 March 
1 999). Given the fact of 26 Muslim-majority constituencies - more than half 
of the 48 state constituencies - some elements in Sabah UMNO believe that 
Sabah UMNO can effectively rule Sabah alone, or at the very least, hold the 
chief ministership in any coalition. 
The Chinese will of course fight any moves to scrap the rotation 
system, but given that the Sabah Chinese community did not wholeheartedly 
support the Sabah BN, there is little the five elected Chinese BN legislators 
can do if Sabah UMNO decides to scrap it. 
The big question hanging over S abah politics is what to do with the 
Kadazan-Dusun? It is obvious that Mahathir and Sabah BN cannot ignore 
the political wishes of a community that constitutes about 40 per cent of 
Sabah' s population; moreover, the Kadazan-Dusun are the largest ethnic 
grouping in Sabah. 
One possibility is the 'PBDS prodigal son' scenario (Chin 1 996a). The 
Iban/Dayaks in Sarawak are very similar to the Kadazan-Dusuns. They feel 
that, as the largest ethnic grouping in Sarawak, they should hold power, or at 
the very least be a major power broker in Sarawak politics. In the 1 960s 
there were two Than chief ministers, but since the Melanau Muslims came 
into power in 1970 the Iban/Dayaks have been completely politically 
marginalized. In 1983, the Iban/Dayaks tried to regain their pre-eminent 
position by establishing a new communal party, Parti Bansa Dayak Sarawak 
(PBDS or Dayak People' s  Party).  Although PBDS was accepted into the 
Sarawak BN and the federal BN, this did not alter the power structure in 
Sarawak. Power was still held by a cabal of Melanau Muslims in Pesaka 
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Bumiputera Bersatu (PBB) and Foochow Chinese in the Sarawak United 
People' s  Party (SUPP). 
Frustration led PBDS to pull out of the Sarawak BN in the 1 987 
Sarawak election and link up with some PBB dissidents. Although PBDS 
was able to win fifteen Dayak-majority seats - almost all the Dayak seats - it 
was still unable to gain power because it could not attract the non-Dayak 
votes. Four year later, PBDS tried to repeat its performance in the 1991  
Sarawak election (Chin 1996d). This time PBDS managed to get only seven 
Dayak seats, undermining its claim to be the political representative of the 
Iban/Dayak people. Unable to hang on to its core Dayak support, PBDS sued 
for peace and was finally re-admitted into the Sarawak BN in 1994. The re­
admission, however, came at a heavy price. PBDS ,  now a member of the 
ruling Sarawak BN, was expected to support all government policies, 
including those detrimental to the Dayak community it seeks to represent. 
PBDS effectively spent seven years in opposition for nothing; it did not gain 
any political muscle and by going back into the Sarawak BN fold, it 
effectively lost all its bargaining chips. The Dayaks are still completely 
marginalized in Sarawak politics. 
Federal leaders are hoping that the experience of the Iban/Dayaks in 
PBDS will be repeated in Sabah. The expectation is that the longer PBS 
stays in opposition, the weaker it will become (like PBDS), and in the next 
state election the Sabah BN will be able to win over a significant number of 
Kadazan-Dusun constituencies, which will render PBS politically impotent. 
PBS will then have to seek readmission into BN, or dump Pairin as leader 
and enter into some sort of alliance or coalition with Sabah BN. 
The problem with the 'PBDS prodigal son ' scenario is that the 
comparison between the lban/Dayaks and Kadazan-Dusun may not be apt. 
For one thing, the Iban/Dayaks do not have a Huguan Siou who can act as a 
unifying point. The Sarawak Iban/Dayak community lacks a leader like 
Joseph Pairin Kitingin in Sabah. There are about half a dozen lban/Dayak 
leaders who can all legitimately claim to represent the Iban/Dayak 
politically. Moreover, the divisions in Dayak groupings are deep and perhaps 
irreconcilable. The Than, the largest Dayak group, for example, is in serious 
political competition with the second largest Dayak group, the Bidayuh. 
Even within Than society, there is deep animosity and rivalry among the 
'modem' !bans (those living close to the major urban areas of Kuching, Sibu 
and Miri) and the 'ulu' !bans (those who live deep in the interior) . 
The clear danger facing PBS in the immediate future is the possibility 
that some of its seventeen assemblymen will be enticed to cross over to 
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Sabah BN. Although Mahathir has unequivocally said that Sabah BN will 
not accept any defectors from PBS because it has a 'majority already' ,  a 
senior member of Sabah UMNO left the possibility open by stating that PBS 
defectors can join the BN if they serve a period as 'independent' (Borneo 
Post 1 8  March 1999). Five days after the election was held, in a pre-emptive 
move, all the newly elected PBS assemblymen with the exception of party 
leader Pairin were flown to Perth, Australia, supposedly for a ' study tour' 
(Daily Express 20 March 1999). It was clear that the PBS leadership was 
worried about defections. 
The PBS fears were not unfounded. Barely three months after the 
elections in June 1 999, Penampang MP Paul Nointein, PBS deputy president 
Abdul Malek Chua, the assemblyman for Kuamut, and Ulin Pamiang, the 
assemblyman for Pensiangan, joined Sabah BN. Nointein joined PDS while 
the other two opted for Sabah UMNO (Daily Express 23 June 1999). Despite 
their denials, there were widespread rumors that each was paid more than 
RM2 million(about US$500,000) to defect, with similar offers to other PBS 
assemblymen as well (Daily Express 22, 23 June 1 999).33 Their defection to 
Sabah UMNO has increased Sabah UMNO's elected members in the 48-seat 
state Legislative Assembly from 24 to 26, while the PBS representation has 
been reduced from 17  to 15 .  The Sabah UMNO chief minister proclaimed 
that the 'doors were open' to individual PBS elected representatives to join 
BN but were 'closed' to PBS to join as a component party of Sabah BN. 
About a week earlier, another PBS deputy president, Datuk Wong Ping 
Chung, also quit the party (Daily Express 10 June 1999). 
It would appear that the Sabah BN' s strategy to weaken PBS was two­
fold. First, it would entice PBS elected representatives to defect; secondly, it 
would specially target PBS Muslim and Chinese elected representatives to 
cross over. The idea was to reduce PBS to a Kadazan-Dusun party with no 
elected representatives from other races. This would make it easier for Sabah 
BN to portray PBS as an ethnic party with Kadazan-Dusun chauvinist 
tendencies (personal communication from senior PBS figure, June 1 999). 
In August, PDS was renamed United Pasok Momogun Kadazandusun 
Organisation (UPKO) (Daily Express 22 August 1999). UPKO was a party 
established by Donald Stephens, the first Huguan Siou, back in 1964 to 
explicitly represent the interests of the Kadazan-Dusun. It received strong 
support from the community but was suddenly dissolved by Stephens in 
1 967 when he j oined Tun Mustapha Harun' s USNO in the name of 
indigenous unity. He also embraced Islam and became Mohammad Fuad 
Stephens (Granville-Edge and Devadason 1999; Roff 1974). PDS' s  decision 
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to change its name reflected the party' s desperation in trying to woo over the 
Kadazan-Dusuns by capitalizing on old sentiments for UPKO, leading many 
in Sabah to mock the renamed party as Untuk Pemimpin Kalah Organisation 
(For Defeated Leaders Organization). Using the UPKO name also suggests 
that the party will be even more explicit in espousing Kadazan-Dusun 
nationalism. 
Repressive-Responsive Regime? 
In a recent publication, Crouch argues that the Malaysian political system, 
based on the BN coalition under UMNO, was both repressive and responsive 
to the Malaysian polity. The system, according to Crouch, was 'neither 
unambiguously democratic nor authoritarian' (Crouch 1 996:240) and while 
Malay demands were met, more often than not important concessions were 
given to the non-Malays, principally the Chinese. Thus, while the Malays 
were given huge subsidies and handouts under the New Economic Policy 
(NEP),34 some sections of the non-Malay communities also benefited from 
the NEP. In the political arena, although UMNO could easily rule on its 
own, nevertheless it has sought to govern through a coalition and give some 
cabinet positions to its coalition partners representing the non-Malay 
communities. Repressive behaviour such as the detention of opposition 
figures (mostly Chinese) without trial has been displayed by the executive 
when Malay/Muslim political supremacy has been threatened or questioned 
by non-Malays. This 'repressive-responsive' regime, according to Crouch, 
accounts for the relatively peaceful and stable political record enjoyed by 
Malaysia since independence. 
I would suggest that Crouch' s analysis is only partly applicable to 
Sabah. While one could argue that Mahathir' s chief-minister-rotation 
scheme was an attempt to 'respond' to the wishes of the Sabah people, and 
that harassment of the democratically-elected PBS government was an 
example of its ' repressive' mode, Mahathir' s actions in Sabah could be 
explained in far simpler terms. It is asserted here that the regime' s  actions in 
Sabah were based simply on trying to impose the peninsular political 
dichotomy of Malay/non-Malay bumiputera lnon-bumiputera Muslim/non­
Muslim, over the existing triangular situation (Muslim bumiputera, non­
Muslim bumiputera, Chinese) in Sabah politics. As noted above, past 
governments in Sabah have tended to have the political support of two of the 
three groups. By gerrymandering the electoral map to ensure an outright 
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Muslim majority, the BN/UMNO government has ensured that politics (and 
voting) from 1999 onwards will be strictly a competition between the 
Muslims and the non-Muslims in the state. In the 1999 election, PBS won 
the support of the Kadazan-Dusun and the majority of the Chinese voters but 
due the dominance of the Muslim constituencies it lost the entire election. It 
is argued here that the 1 999 election result indicates that the Mahathir 
regime has succeeded, in part, in imposing the peninsular dichotomy. 
One could also argue that Mahathir' s  offer of a rotation system was a 
meaningless gesture given the reality of Muslim dominance behind the 
scenes. When Sabah UMNO reluctantly gave up the chief minister' s post 
under the rotation system, the price was the transfer of key discretionary 
powers of the chief minister to cabinet. With Sabah illv1NO always holding a 
majority in cabinet (the '5 :3 :3 '  formula has been used for the distribution of 
Sabah cabinet posts, i.e . ,  5 Sabah UMNO; 3 non-Muslim bumiputera; 3 
Chinese), any chief minister will have to get the approval or consent of 
Sabah UMNO for all major policies. Hence Mahathir' s strong public support 
for the rotation system was, at most, a public relations exercise rather than 
any real 'response' to the people' s wish for 'power sharing' .  
The motive for imposing the rigid peninsular dichotomy was fairly 
obvious. By imposing the Muslim/non-Muslim dichotomy, and by extension 
Muslim political supremacy and hegemony, the regime was hoping to bring 
some sort of uniformity to the entire political system. As we have seen, the 
Mahathir regime (and its predecessors) encountered major problems dealing 
with Sabah over the issue of state rights (specifically the Twenty Points) . By 
bringing UMNO into Sabah and imposing the same political framework as 
states on the peninsula, the Mahathir regime was obviously hoping that state 
rights issues would be less politically potent in the future. Sabah, it is hoped, 
would eventually be just another state in the federation. 
Thus the regime' s  approach to Sabah politics has more to do with the 
state of federal-state relations than with the 'responsive-repressive' strategy. 
The threat of Sabah (and potentially Sarawak) seceding from the federation 
has pushed the regime to impose its brand of politics on Sabah despite the 
apparent differences in demography, history and political culture. 
As we have seen, this strategy appeared to have worked among the 
S abah Muslims but not among the non-Muslims. The non-Muslims, 
especially the Kadazan-Dusun, have clearly demonstrated that they reject the 
peninsular brand of politics and may have hardened their anti-federal 
sentiments. The non-Muslims have every reason to reject the peninsula BN 
style of politics.  In peninsular Malaysia, politics is clearly divided along 
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religious and ethnic lines, while in Sabah the lines are not so transparent. In 
the past, Muslims have supported non-Muslim parties; for example, the 
Muslims supported PBS in the 198 6  elections.  Non-Muslims have also 
supported Muslim-led parties; for example, the support given to Berjaya in 
1976 and 198 1 by the Kadazan-Dusun and the Chinese. 
In the peninsula, UMNO' s constant push for greater Islamic symbols 
and stricter adherence to Islam in all government-related activities has 
alienated many non-Muslims, especially the Christian community who live 
under a siege mentality. In contrast, religious tolerance has always been high 
in Sabah, and the Roman Catholic church has always played a prominent 
role in the lives of the Kadazan-Dusun and the Chinese. Moreover, unlike 
the peninsula, the Muslims in Sabah are a minority in the state. Past leaders, 
like Mustapha and Harris, who tried to push Islamization too flagrantly, were 
punished severely at the polls. This may no longer be possible given that 
more than half of the constituencies in Sabah are now Muslim-majority 
seats. 
Ethnic relations between the Malays and the non-Malays are poor in 
the peninsula while in Sabah, relations, while not perfect, are certainly better 
than those found on the peninsula. The plural population (Sabah has more 
than 26 ethnic groups) with no single ethnic group constituting an outright 
majority, has ensured a higher degree of racial interaction and cooperation. 
What is happening in Sabah could be taken as a precursor to what may 
happen in Sarawak, a state with similar demographics to Sabah. UMNO 
clearly wants to expand into Sarawak, the only state in the federation where 
it is not present, and fulfill its desire for a truly nation-wide political 
organization. One might speculate that the federal government has used 
Sabah as a laboratory to test strategies of bringing the politics of the two 
Borneoan states into line with those of the peninsula states The S abah 
experience has shown, however, that this will not be easy and may even 
heighten regional sentiments among Sarawak' s plural population . .  
CONCLUSION 
In Malaysian electoral politics, the incumbent BN has always enjoyed an in­
built advantage. This has ranged from the use of government facilities and 
personnel for campaigning, and extensive use of state-owned media to 
promote the ruling coalition, through 'on the spot' government grants and 
promises of development funds, to gross gerrymandering and seemingly 
unlimited financial resources for campaigning. 
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Despite this, the Sabah BN performed poorly in Sabah in 1999. Its 
thirty-one seats were gained mostly through gerrymandering, which gave the 
ruling coalition twenty-six Muslim-maj ority constituencies; the bloc vote 
given to Sabah UMNO by the Muslim community; and promises worth 
billions of ringgit in development expenditure which helped to secure votes 
from the non-Muslim communities, especially the Chinese. The BN received 
about 46 per cent of the votes. This meant that more than half of the Sabah 
voters rejected the ruling coalition and its brand of peninsula-based 
ethno/religious politics. More seriously, S abah BN was unable to win a two­
thirds majority, the yardstick often used to measure the success of the ruling 
coalition in Malaysia. Only through a legacy of colonization (the six 
appointed assembly members) was the S abah BN able to get its two-thirds 
majority. 
Politically the most damaging outcome was the failure of Sabah BN to 
win political support from the largest indigenous group in Sabah, the 
Kadazan-Dusun. The community rallied behind PBS despite threats that it 
would have to bear a heavy political price. PBS'  s ability to win in almost all 
the Kadazan-Dusun areas clearly indicated that it had the full support of the 
community it seeks to represent. 
On a broader level, the state election confirmed the dominance of 
parochial state issues in Sabah politics .  The inability of PAS to use the 
Anwar issue to garner votes, and the failure of major contestants to raise any 
nation-wide issues suggest that the people of Sabah have not fully integrated 
into the federation, even after thirty-six years, and that voting patterns in 
Sabah cannot be used an indicator for polls in the rest of the federation. 
The fierce loyalty shown by the indigenous Kadazan-Dusun towards 
the PBS suggests that political integration among the bumiputera groupings 
has been a massive failure. Although the Kadazan-Dusun are bumiputera by 
legal definition, it is obvious that they do not identify with the main 
bumiputera group, the ethnic Malay. Islam was clearly the divisive factor 
here. So long as UMNO merges the image of Islam with that of the Malay 
race, and, by extension, implies that a bumiputera should be a Muslim, the 
non-Muslim indigenous peoples will continue to feel disenfranchised. 
The federal factor was also important. The anti-BN votes of the 
Kadazan-Dusun and the majority of the Chinese community suggest that a 
large segment of Sabah people do not see Kuala Lumpur in friendly terms. 
In the near future, it is almost certain that the Sabah BN machinery 
will be used to isolate the Kadazan-Dusun community, economically and 
politically, both as a punishment and as a lc:sson to others. Small 
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development funds for Kadazan-Dusun areas will be given out only through 
BN agents in constituencies controlled by the PBS. Major projects will be 
shelved until the next election to show the Kadazan-Dusun the virtues of 
voting for the Sabah BN. Pressure will also be exerted on the three main BN 
Kadazan-Dusun parties to merge into a single entity, given that individually 
all three are extremely weak. The hope is that a single Kadazan-Dusun party 
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I would like to thank the many individuals from Sabah, especially those from 
PBS and BN, who provided much information. I am grateful to Ron May and 
Harold Crouch for useful suggestions on the first draft. I would also like to 
thank the UPNG Research Committee for partially funding a field trip to 
Sabah in 1 998 .  At the time of the election, one US dollar was fixed at 
Malaysian ringgit (lv!R.) 3 .80. 
The early political history of Sabah is covered in Milne and Ratnam ( 1974) ; 
Roff (1974), and Lee (1974). 
For a fuller discussion on the conflict between the federal government and 
the state governments of Sabah and Sarawak over the Twenty Points, see 
Chin ( 1997). 
This term 'second class bumiputera' was emphasized to me by a Christian 
Kadazan-Dusun state assemblyman. 'First-class b umiputera ' refers to 
Muslim bumiputera. 
The only exception in the peninsula was in 1 978, when Kelantan, a northern 
state, held a state election. The election was called under special 
circumstances, beyond the scope of this paper. 
Singapore was thrown out of the Malaysian federation in 1 965 by Tunku 
Abdul Rahman, Malaysia' s first prime minister. This led to a serious split in 
UMNO as many senior UMNO officials felt that Tunku should not have 
taken the 'easy route' . Rather, they wanted Singapore to remain in the 
federation, under duress if necessary. 
This figure was given by Pairin. Of course those who defected later were paid 
a lot less. 
PDSB was unable to get registered as a political party. 
Anwar met with all Sabah UMNO legislators at the Kota Kinabalu airport. 
See Daily Express [Kota Kinabalu] 4 May 1996. 
Interviews with senior PBS figures. See also Daily Express 10-20 June 1 996 
on the controversy generated by the bills. 
Interestingly enough, the Sabah Chinese vote went against the nation-wide 
trend, in which the urban Chinese voted for the BN ruling coalition. 
In interviews, both opposition and government politicians freely admit that 
many illegal Filipino and Indonesian Muslims were issued with blue identity 


















to vote. These cards can only be issued by the federal government' s 
department of registration. 
YB stands for Yang Berhormat (The Honourable), a popular term for elected 
representatives. 
In Malaysia, all the senators in the upper house are appointed. At the local 
government level, all district and town councillors are also appointed directly 
by the government, giving the ruling party a powerful patronage tool. 
The background to UMNO's entry into Sabah is discussed in Chin ( 1999). 
In Malaysia, members of the Upper House, Dewan Negara (Senate) are 
appointed by the government, giving the BN a powerful source of patronage . 
Daily Express 26 September 1 997. See the many letters written by PBS party 
members against the return of Jeffrey Kitingan, in Daily Express 1 2  October 
1 997. 
The winning Pasok candidate joined PBS immediately after the election. 
In order to get the election deposit back, the candidate must get at least one­
eighth of the total votes cast in the constituency. 
Inherited from the colonial authorities, the Sabah Constitution allows for the 
nomination of six assemblymen, bringing the total membership of the Sabah 
Assembly to fifty-six. The nomination is done by the chief minister. 
In the Elopura constituency in Sandakan where the incumbent Tham Nyip 
Shen (BN-SAPP) was being challenged by Chong Ket Wah (PBS), the SAPP 
ceramah (political talk) on 8 and 9 March 1999 featured a video on racial 
riots and armed conflicts in Indonesia, Sri Lanka and Kosovo. Tham won. 
See Mahathir' s  speech as reported in Overseas Chinese Daily News 6 March 
1 999. 
Personal communication from a Sabah politician. Khalil Yaakob did such a 
good job in Sabah that he was promoted to the post of UMNO secretary­
general shortly after the Sabah elections. His brief was to get UMNO ready 
for the general elections. 
See statements issued by SUARAM, a NGO which sent an election 
monitoring team to Sabah. 
Personal communication from a senior Sabah politician. 
See statement from Aliran, a NGO, dated 1 6  March 1 999. 
Bersekutu' s leader Harris resigned from the party shortly after the polls, 
which led to a flood of resignations. Bersekutu is basically a 'mosquito' 









There are different ways of classifying ethnic seats. In this paper, I have 
taken the simple rule: if any community (Muslim, non-Muslim 
(predominantly Kadazan-Dusun) or Chinese) constitutes more than 50 per 
cent of the voters in any constituency, then that constituency is an ethnic seat. 
A 'mixed constituency' is one where no one group made up more than 50 per 
cent of the voters. 
Despite his public pledge to 'retire' from politics should he be defeated, 
Dompok has not done so at the time of writing (September 1999). 
Bombings and rioting occurred after PBS won the 1 986 state election. 
USNO and Berjaya had hoped that the bombings and rioting would lead to a 
security breakdown and direct federal rule from Kuala Lumpur. The senior 
USNO and Berjaya members, including the former USNO secretary-general, 
publicly admitted their involvement in the 1 985 bombing campaign, fourteen 
years later. See Daily Express 14 January 1999. 
During ceramah (campaign speeches) in Kota Kinabalu, many local Chinese 
were especially am.used when MCA campaigners from Peninsular Malaysian 
told them that MCA' s record in 'protecting' Chinese interests was second to 
none. A member of the audience then asked the MCA representative, if this 
was so, how come there are no Chinese chief ministers or menteri-besar in 
the peninsula. The MCA representative was lost for words (personal 
communication from a Sabah journalist). 
This information was given to the author by a senior PBS politician. 
According to the politician, a former Registration Department officer went to 
PBS and told the party the location of the phantom voters. This officer, who 
had just been released from prison for his part in issuing illegal Malaysian IC 
(Identity Cards) to illegal migrants, went to the opposition after the BN 
refused his request for financial aid. A senior BN politician verified this 
story. 
See the newsreports in the New Sunday Times and The Sunday Star 1 5  March 
1 999. The Daily Express in Kota Kinabalu headlined 'Barisan Wins Big' . 
It will be recalled that Chua . wrote a book YB for Sale just prior to the 
election, criticising elected representatives for hopping from one party to 
another. Obviously Chua is not one who practices what he preaches. 
The NEP was an affirmative action program giving bumiputera (Malay) 
preferential access in all social and economic spheres. For example, Malays 
have special access to university scholarships, loans for business,  and special 
'bumiputera only' trading licenses. 
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FIGURE 1 .  Map of Sabah' s 48 Constituencies 
(source: Bernama) 
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TABLE 1. The 1995 Parliamentary Election Results in Sabah 
(Source: Chin 1 996b) 
Constituencies BN PBS l DAP Ind 
Muslim bumiputera 
Marudu 10766 10880 
Belud 17368 10327 
Papar 12131  9015 257 
Beaufort 147 1 9  10076 221 
Sipitang 9732 5208 1 62 
Beluran 5869 5679 
Libaran 12777 5453 215  
Kinabating 643 1 4533 
Silam 15815 6737 
Sempoma 17006 4788 
Tawau 201 68 1 1037 372 
Total 142782 83733 1227 






Constituencies BN PBS DAP Ind PAS 
Non-Muslim bumiputera 
Bandau 5,85 1 10716  1 62 
Tuaran 10108 121 14 
Penanpan 12982 14652 
Keningau 8736 17510 
Tenom 7025 9949 105 
Total 44, 702 64941 267 
% 40.67 59.08 0.24 
Chinese 
Gaya 12336 12127 154 1  43 1 
Tanjung Aru 8788 10306 4142 
Kinabalu 6462 7973 1 953 
Sandakan 12892 4103 98 1 8  
Total 40478 34509 15501 2384 
% 43.58 37.16 16.69 2.57 
Grand Total 227962 183183 16902 3878 825 
% 52.68 42.33 3. 90 0.90 0. 19 
DAP: Democratic Action Party Key: BN: Barisan Nasional 
PBS:  Parti Bersatu Sabah PAS: Parti Islam Malaysia Ind: Independent 
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TABLE 2. The 1999 Sabah Election Results 
(Source: Malaysian Election Commission web site) 
Constituencies BN PBS Berse- Seti a PAS Ind. Pasok 
kutu 
Muslim bumiputera 
B anggi 2854 1 840 454 38 
Tempasuk 49 1 1  4176 368 38 239 61 
Usukan 7 1 27 3503 894 
Sulaman 657 1 3 127 886 100 
Likas 9 1 10 4148 3576 3 1 8  200 100 
Petagas 9234 5447 960 122 
Kawang 701 7  4804 282 1 17 49 
Pantai Manis (formerly 7357 4823 458 143 
Buang Sayang) 
Bonga wan 6087 3795 1 63 54 343 
Kuala Penyu 4956 4072 468 69 
Klias 7209 343 1 640 
Lumadan 4678 23 1 6  847 3 12 
Sindumin ( Sipitang) 4794 3 1 12 934 
Su gut 2405 2151  216  123 
Labuk 3349 4478 217 77 473 
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Constituencies BN PBS Berse- Setia PAS Ind. Pasok 
kutu 
Sungai Sibuga 7927 3893 2166 282 
Sekong 3230 1 860 1246 581  121  
Sukau 3988 816  1519  1 26 101  
Kuamut 2777 3286 1 37 1  
Kunak 4619 2126 1 987 503 
Lahad Datu 7781  6547 2933 579 
Sulabayan 3302 785 2340 786 
Senallang (new seat) 4855 1637 3297 
B alung 4787 2934 2729 
Merotai 5265 42 1 8  2653 373 1 1 3 
Kalabakan (new seat) 5127 1 877 1593 157 293 17 
Total 14131 7 85202 35197 3383 1352 2273 
% 52.59 31. 71 13. 10 1.26 0.50 0.84 
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Constituencies BN PBS Berse- Setia PAS Ind. Pasok 
kutu 
Non-Muslim bumiputera 
Matunggung 3602 5326 292 60 
Tandek 441 2  5671 463 
Kadamaian 2725 6583 1 5 1  
Tamparuli 3939 6125 475 
Kiulu 1 622 5007 142 
Moyong 6482 10870 285 79 1 8  
Kundasang 4102 4201 48 1 72 
Ranau 6074 4847 224 53 
Tambunan 21 16 679 1  1 69 141 
Pensiangan ( Nabawan) 2655 3934 616  
Kemabong 4741 3905 274 
Melalap (Tenon) 4626 6886 337 1 3 1  
Total 47096 70146 3909 326 210 18 
% 38. 70 57.64 3.22 0.27 0. 1 7  0.015 
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Constituencies BN PBS Berse- Setia PAS Ind. Pasok 
kutu 
Chinese 
Api-Api 5963 9146 1040 
Tanjung Papat 4482 2786 23 1 1  
Sri Tanjong 5007 8759 3814 155 
Karamunting 471 9  2922 2124 59 
In an am 4940 9648 108 1  
Total 2511 1  33261 10370 214 
% 36.42 48.24 15. 04  0.31 
Mixed Constituencies 
Kudat 6935 5447 481 105 
Bengkoka. 4042 2121 21 1 97 558 
Sembulan 5 1 6 1  5464 2109 70 
Bingkor 487 1 8339 395 22 




% 45. 78 
Grand Total 240110 
% 46.40 
Key: BN: Barisan Nasional 
PBS:  Patti Bersatu Sabah 











54742 4187 1352 
10.58 0.81 0.26 
Pasok: Pertubuhan Kebangsaan Pasok Nunukragang Bersatu 
Bersekutu: Patti Bersekutu 





0.66 0. 003 
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TABLE 3. Candidates and Ethnic Profiles of Constituencies, 1999 
(Source: Bernama - National News Agency, Kuala Lumpur) 
BANGGI 
1 .  Datuk Amirkahar Tun Mustapha (BN-Sabah UMNO) 
2. Salbin Muksin (PBS) 
3 .  Ghazali Harris (Bersekutu) 
4. Maria Tam (Independent) 
Incumbent: Datuk Amirkahar Tun Mustapha (BN-Sabah UMNO) - votes 
received, 1994: 2,335 : majority 347(won seat as PBS) 
Voters 1 999: 7,650 (Muslim bumiputera 64%, non-Muslim bumiputera 35.88%, 
Chinese 0. 12%, others 0%) [1994 - 6,555 (56.96%, 42.79%, 0.24%, 0.0 1  %)] 
KUDAT 
1 .  Senator Datuk Chong Kah Kiat (BN-LDP) 
2. Jimmy Wong Sze Fhin (Bersekutu) 
3. Kong Hong Ming (PBS) 
4. Ahmad @ Tawang Jalil (Setia) 
Incumbent: Datuk Kong Hong Ming (PBS) - votes received, 1994: 5,476: 
majority 279 (won seat on BN-LDP) 
Voters 1 999: 17,977 (Muslim bumiputera 42.07%, non-Muslim bumiputera 
24.08%, Chinese 33.49%, others 0.36%) [ 1994 - 15,298 (42.77%, 23.05%, 
34.03%, 0. 15%)] 
BENGKOKA 
1. Paul Tom Imbayan (Independent) 
2. Dayang Maimunah Tun Mustapha (Bersekutu) 
3. Tsen Kwet Chong (Setia) 
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4. Richard Mazagi (PBS) 
5.  Datuk Masrani Parman (BN-Sabah UMNO) 
Incumbent: Masrani Parman (BN-Sabah UMNO) - votes received, 1994: 3,5 1 1 :  
majority 357 
Voters 1999: 10,384 Muslim bumiputera 50.91 %, non-Muslim bumiputera 
48. 17%, Chinese 0.92%, others 0% [ 1 994 - 9,033 (52. 15%, 46.62%, 1 . 19%, 
0.04%)] 
MATUNGGUNG 
1 .  Atong Mangabis (PBS) 
2. Berman Angkap (Bersekutu) 
3 .  Datuk Marcus Majihi (BN-Akar) 
4. Junan Olok (Setia) 
Incumbent: Datuk Marcus Majihi (BN-Akar) - votes received, 1 994: 3 ,826: 
majority 1,843 (won seat on PBS) 
Voters 1999: 1 1 ,627 (Muslim Bumiputera 1 3 .4%, non-Muslim bumiputera 
83.75%, Chinese 2.75%, others 0. 1 %) [ 1 994 - 8,350 ( 17.93%, 79.46%, 
2.59%, 0.02% )] 
TANDEK 
1 .  Joe Santi (Bersekutu) Abd 
2. Datuk Saibul Supu (BN-PDS) 
3. Dr Maximus Johnity Ongkili (PBS) 
Incumbent: Saibul Supu (BN-PDS) - votes received, 1994: 2,926; majority 668 
(won seat on PBS) 
Voters 1999: 1 3,864 (Muslim bumiputera 23.67%, non-Muslim bumiputera 
7 1 .3 1  %, Chinese 4.96%, others 0.06%) [ 1994 - 6,938 (32.91 %,  65 .47%, 
1 .55%, 0.07%] 
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TEMPASUK 
1 .  Salam Hj Gibang (PBS) 
2. Musbah Jamli (BN-Sabah UMNO) 
3. Mohd Aminuddin Aling (PAS) 
4. Masud Nanang (Setia) 
5. Dausin Pangalin (Independent) 
6. Ibrahim Linggam (Bersekutu) 
Incumbent: Datuk Pandikar Amin Mulia (BN-Akar) - votes received, 1 994: 
4, 142; majority 947 
Voters 1 999: 12,239 (Muslim bumiputera 60.5%, non-Muslim bumiputera 
38.47%, Chinese 0.45%, others 0.58%) [ 1994 - 10,858 (59 . 1 %, 39.93 %, 
0.45%, 0.52%)] 
KADAMAIAN 
1 .  Lidu @ Serirama Johari (Bersekutu) 
2. Timbon @ Herbert Lagadan (PBS) 
3. Datuk Baggai Basirun (BN-PDS) 
Incumbent: Datuk Baggai Basirun (BN-PDS) - votes received, 1994: 5 , 1 27;  
majority 3,032 (won seat on PBS) 
Voters 1 999: 1 1 ,536 (Muslim bumiputera 8.43%, non-Muslim bumiputera 
90.77%, Chinese 0.72%, others 0.08%) [ 1 994 - 8,945 ( 18 .5%, 80.8%, 0.7%, 
0)] 
USUKAN 
1 .  Mudry Nasir (Bersekutu) 
2. Saidil @ Saidi Simoy (PBS) 
3 .  Datuk Mohd Salleh Tun Said Keruak (BN-Sabah UMNO) 
Incumbent: Datuk Mohd Salleh Tun Said Keruak (BN-Sabah UMNO) - votes 
received, 1994: 6,274; majority 2,683 
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Voters 1999: 14,526 (Muslim bumiputera 89.24%, non-Muslim bumiputera 
2.78%, Chinese 6.77%, others 1 .21  %) [ 1994 - 1 2,452 (77%, 16.23%, 6.24%, 
0.53)] 
TAMPARULI 
1 .  Mojilip Bumburing (BN-PDS) 
2. Datuk Monggoh Orow (Bersekutu) 
3 .  Edward Linggu Bukut (PBS) 
Incumbent: Datuk Wilfred Bumburing (BN-PDS) - votes received, 1 994: 6,347; 
majority 5,087 (won seat on PBS) 
Voters 1999: 1 3,487 (Muslim bumiputera 20.54%, non-Muslim bumiputera 
59.46%, Chinese 19.66%, others 0.34%) [ 1994 - 9,658 (21 .34%, 66.80%, 
1 1 .75%, 0.2% )] 
SULAMAN 
1 .  Datuk Hajiji Mohd Noor (BN-Sabah UMNO) 
2. Rakam Sijim (PBS) 
3 .  Hamdin @ Din Abd Kadir (Setia) 
4. Mohamed Daud Abdullah (Bersekutu) 
Incumbent: Datuk Hajiji Mohd Noor (BN-Sabah UMNO) - votes received, 
1994: 5,016; majority 876 
Voters 1999: 13 ,968 (Muslim bumiputera 82.97%, non-Muslim bumiputera 
1 3 .49%, Chinese 3 .09%, others 0.45%) [ 1994 - 1 1 ,77 1 (65.05 %, 2 1 .69%, 
12.97%, 0.29% )] 
KIULU 
1 .  Lovis Rampas (PBS) 
2. Datuk Gisin Lombut (BN-PDS) 
3 .  Seibing Gunting (Bersekutu) 
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Incumbent: Gisin Lombut (BN-PDS) - votes received, 1994: 4,354; majority 
2,528 (won seat on PBS) 
Voters 1999: 1 3 ,968 (Muslim bumiputera 6.32%, non-Muslim bumiputera 
90.03%, Chinese 3.62%, others 0.03%) [ 1994 - 8, 156 (30.59%, 64.77%, 
4.63%, 0. 1 %)] 
INANAM 
1 .  Judy Hiew Miu Nyuk (Bersekutu) 
2. Datuk Christine Vanhouten Tibok (BN-PDS) 
3. Johnny Goh (PBS) 
Incumbent: Datuk Stephen Kutai (BN-PDS) - votes received, 1994: 7,907; 
majority 4,079 (won seat on PBS) 
Voters 1999: 2 1 ,433 (Muslim bumiputera 1 1 .88%, non-Muslim bumiputera 
34.59%, Chinese 53.24%, others 0.28%) [ 1994 - 15 ,566 (30.37%, 40.04%, 
29.42%, 0. 17%] 
LIKAS 
1 .  Saujin Kadir (Independent) 
2. Datuk Yong Teck Lee (BN-SAPP) 
3 .  Gamparon Lajah (Setia) 
4. Yahya Kassim (PAS) 
5. Datuk Harris Mohd Salleh (Bersekutu) 
6. Chong Eng Leong (PBS) 
Incumbent: Datuk Yong Teck Lee (BN-SAPP) - 8,035; majority 2, 180 
Voters 1999: 25,976 (Muslim bumiputera 55 .44%, non-Muslim bumiputera 
1 2. 15%, Chinese 32.01  %, others 0.40%) [ 1994 - 19,756 (38 .87%, 4.52%, 
55.68%, 0.93%] 
API API 
1 .  Chin Chen Fui (Bersekutu) 
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2. Datuk Chau Tet On (BN-MCA) 
3. Dr Yee Moh Chai (PBS) 
Incumbent: Datuk Chau Tet On (BN-MCA) - votes received, 1994: 9, 1 32; 
majority 4,294 (won seat on PBS) 
Voters 1999: 23, 107 (Muslim bumiputera 7 .38%, non-Muslim bumiputera 
5.69%, Chinese 86.21 %, others 0.72%) [ 1994 - 20,016  (6.23%, 5.64%, 
87.09%, 1 .04%] 
SEMBULAN 
1 .  Yong Oui Fah (PBS) 
2. Datuk Chau Chin Tang (BN-SAPP) 
3 .  Dr Tan Kok Sui (Bersekutu) 
4. Datu Bara Datu Alawaddin (Independ�nt) 
Incumbent: Datuk Chau Chin Tang (BN-SAPP) - votes received, 1994: 4,777; 
majority 298 (won on PBS seat) 
Voters 1999: 1 8,616 (Muslim bumiputera 39.49%, non Muslim bumiputera 
10.27%, Chinese 49.46%, others 0.78%) [1994 - 13,504 (38.7 1 %, 8.3 1 %, 
5 1 .95%, 1 .03%] 
MOYOG 
1 .  Datuk Clarence Bongkos Malakun (PBS) 
2. Datuk Conrad Mojuntin (Independent) 
3 .  Tan Sri Bernard Dompok (BN-PDS) 
4. Legacy @ Ignatius Matayun (Independent) 
5 .  Cleftus Si pain Mojingol (Pasok) 
6.Benedict Sakunil Mansul (Bersekutu) 
Incumbent: Tan Sri Bernard Dompok (BN-PDS) - votes received, 1994: 6,615 ;  
majority 3,255 (won on PBS seat) 
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Voters 1999: 22,61 6  (Muslim bumiputera 5.89%, non-Muslim bumiputera 
60.98%, Chinese 32.58%, others 0.55%) [ 1994 - 14,242 ( 19.96%, 65 .38%, 
1 3 .65%, 1 .01 % )]  
PET A GAS 
1 .  Datuk Yahya Russin (BN-Sabah illvfNO) 
2. Mohd Dini Mohd Khan (Bersekutu) 
3. Musa Abdul Rahman (Setia) 
4. Hj Uda Sulai (PBS) 
Incumbent: Datuk Yahya Russin (BN-Sabah UMNO) - votes received, 1 994: 
7,5 13 ;  majority 1 , 190 
Voters 1999: 23, 152 (Muslim bumiputera 69.76%, non-Muslim bumiputera 
15.53%, Chinese 1 1 . 1  %, others 3.61 % ) [ 1994 - 20,350 (54.03 %, 19.68%, 
25 .6%, 0.69% )] 
KA WANG 
1 .  Datuk Pengiran Othman Rauf (Setia) 
2. Datuk Osu Sukam (BN-Sabah UMNO) 
3 .  Datuk Ariah Tengku Ahmad (PBS) 
4. Mohd Kanit Omar (Bersekutu) 
5 .  Patrick Singh (Independent) 
Incumbent: Datuk Osu Sukam (BN-Sabah UMNO) - votes received, 1994: 
4,699; majority 64 
Voters 1999: 15,458 (Muslim bumiputera 54.84%, non-Muslim bumiputera 
34. 1 1  %, Chinese 10. 14%, other 0.9 1  %) [ 1 994 - 1 1 ,787 (5 1 .7%, 37.5%, 
10.72%, 0.08%)] 
PANTAI MANIS 
1 .  Mohd Ishak Laimudin (Bersekutu) 
2. Datuk Abdul Rahim Ismail (BN-Sabah UMNO) 
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3. Juani @ Johnny Mositun (PBS) 
4. Dr Zainuddin Mohamed (Setia) 
Incumbent: Datuk Abdul Rahim Ismail (BN-Sabah UMNO) - votes received, 
1994: 6,359; majority 1 ,643 
Voters 1999: 16, 1 32 (Muslim bumiputera 53.23%, non Muslim bumiputera 
28.37%, Chinese 17 .28%, other 1 . 12%) [1994 - 13,802 (56.43%, 26.9%, 
16.41 %, 0.26%)] 
BONGA WAN 
1 .  Abdul Karim Abdul Ghani (Setia) 
2. Ajmain Abdul Gani (Independent) 
3. Datuk Karim Bujang (BN-Sabah UMNO) 
4. Datuk Dzulkifli Abd Hamid (Bersekutu) 
5 .  Awang Tengah Awang Amin (PBS) 
Incumbent: Datuk Karim Bujang (BN-Sabah UMNO) - votes received, 1 994: 
5 ,498 ; majority 1 ,902 
Voters 1999: 13 ,659 (Muslim bumiputera 64.68%, non-Muslim bumiputera 
27.06%, Chinese 8 .2%, others 0.06%) [ 1994 - 1 1 ,868 (65.41%,  25.78%, 
8.66%, 0. 15%)] 
KUALA PENYU 
1 .  Hj Asmat Hj Misrin (Independent) 
2. Md Tajudin Md Walli (Independent) 
3. Marcellinus Augustine Piong (PBS) 
4. Awang Hashim Awang Gador (Bersekutu) 
5. Datuk Wences Anggang (BN-PDS) 
Incumbent: Datuk Wences Anggang (BN-PDS) - votes received, 1994: 4,430; 
majority 400 (won seat on PBS)  
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Voters 1 999: 1 2,066 (Muslim bumiputera 56.6%, non-Muslim bumiputera 
36.09%, Chinese 6.98%, others 0.32%)( 1994 - 10,486 (56%, 35.59%, 8 .2%, 
0.21 % )] 
KLIAS 
1 .  Datuk Lajim Ukin (BN-Sabah UMNO) 
2. Abdul Rahman Md Yakub (PBS) 
3. Ustaz Saidin Musi (Bersekutu) 
Incumbent: Datuk Lajim Ukin (BN-Sabah UMNO) - votes received, 1994: 
4,88 1 ;  majority 405 (won seat on PBS)  
Voters 1999: 15 ,073 (Muslim bumiputera 63.46%, non-Muslim bumiputera 
18 .46, Chinese 17.99%, others 0.09%) [ 1994 - 12,033 (59.05%, 22.77%, 
17.8 1 %, 0.37%)] 
LUMADAN 
1 .  Abdul Sulaiman Omar (Bersekutu) 
2. Surinam Sandikong (BN-Sabah UMNO) 
3. Yusof Judin (PBS) 
4. Jahari @ Johari Mohd Dun (Setia) 
Incumbent: Datuk Dayang Mahani Tun Rafaee (BN-Sabah UMNO) -votes 
received, 1994: 4,5 17;  majority 1 ,768 
Voters 1 999: 10,648 (Muslim bumiputera 89.44%, non-Muslim bumiputera 
4.72%, Chinese 5 .44%, others 0.4%) [ 1994 - 9,065 (86.37%,  7.83%, 5 .78%, 
0.02%)] 
SINDUMIN 
1 .  Pengiran Sarpudin Ahmad (Bersekutu) 
2. Datuk Sapawi Ahmad (BN-Sabah UMNO) 
3. Jamilah @ Halimah Sulaiman (PBS) 
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Incumbent: Datuk Sapawi Ahmad (BN-Sabah UMNO) - votes received, 1994: 
4,580; majority 1 ,446 
Voters 1 999: 1 2,070 Muslim bumiputera 6 1 .68%, non-Muslim bumiputera 
30.65%, Chinese 7.35%, others 0.32% [ 1 994 - 9,702 (65 .25%, 27.24%, 
7.07%, 0.44%)] 
KUNDASANG 
1 .  Datuk Ewon Ebin (BN-PDS) 
2. Ramdi Indang (Bersekutu) 
3.  Karim Adam (PBS) 
4. Benjimin Yasin (Setia) 
Incumbent: Datuk Ewin Ebin (BN-PDS) - votes received, 1 994: 4,956; majority 
2,528 (won seat on PBS) 
Voters 1 999: 1 1 ,539 (Muslim bumiputera 4 1 .3 1  %, non-Muslim bumiputera 
58.25 %, Chinese 0.41  %, others 0.03%) [ 1 994 - 1 1 ,061 (30.99%, 68.36%, 
0.62%, 0.03% )] 
RANAU 
1 .  Datuk Sirigan Gubat (BN-PDS) 
2. Henrynus Amin (PBS) 
3. Muslien Baringkok (Bersekutu) 
4. Sutian @ Phoulus Kendilong (Setia) 
Incumbent: Datuk Sirigan Gubat (BN-PDS) - votes received, 1994: 4,615 ;  
majority 1 , 1 22 (won seat on PBS) 
Voters 1 999: 14,542 (Muslim bumiputera 37.5%, non-Muslim bumiputera 
55.46%, Chinese 6.75%, others 0.3 1  % ) [ 1994 - 10,329 (35.96%, 55.95%, 
6.76%, 0.33% )] 
TAMBUNAN 
1 .  Joseph J outi A jun (Bersekutu) 
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2. Datuk Joseph Pairin Kitingan (PBS) 
3 .  Juili Matimbun (Setia) 
4. Petrus Guriunting (BN-PDS) 
Incumbent: Datuk Joseph Pairin Kitingan (PBS) - votes received, 1994: 6,265 ; 
majority 5,696 
Voters 1999: 1 1 ,086 (Muslim bumiputera 5 . 12%, non-Muslim bumiputera 
92.46%, Chinese 2.24%, others 0. 18%) [ 1994 - 8,153 (4. 1 2%, 92.59%, 
3.01 %, 0.28%)] 
BING KOR 
1 .  Datuk Joseph Kurup (BN-PBRS) 
2. Kuilan Anggau @Justina (Bersekutu) 
3. Datuk Dr Jeffrey Kitingan (PBS) 
4. Peter Kodou (Independent) 
Incumbent: Datuk Dr Jeffrey Kitingan (PBS)  - votes received, 1994: 6,408; 
majority 4, 1 59 (won on a PBS seat, jumped to PBRS, Akar, back to PBS) 
Voters 1999: 19,009 (Muslim bumiputera 39. 18%, non-Muslim bumiputera 
47.8%, Chinese 13 .01 %, others 0.01 %) [ 1994 - 12,061 ( 1 8 .48%, 74.54%, 
6.69%, 0.29%)] 
PENSIANGAN 
1 .  Ulin Pamiang (PBS) 
2. Ellron Angin (BN-PBRS) 
3. SUSURU @ SIMON ANTIBAK (Bersekutu) 
Incumbent: Datuk Adib Sigoh (BN-PBRS) - votes received, 1994: 2,370; 
majority 623 (won seat on PBS jumped to Sabah UMNO and joined PBRS) 
Voters 1999: 10,240 (Muslim bumiputera 1 2.98%, non-Muslim bumiputera 




1 .  Datuk Kadoh Agundong (BN-Akar) 
2. George Rejos (Independent) 
3 .  Jait Mahat (Independent) 
4. Edward Sibin (Bersekutu) 
5 .  Radin Malleh (PBS) 
Incumbent: Datuk Kadoh Agundong (BN-Akar) - votes received, 1994: 3,498; 
majority 1 ,898 (won seat on PBS) 
Voters 1999: 1 6,607 (Muslim bumiputera 22.69%, non-Muslim bumiputera 
50.94%, Chinese 25 .99%, others 0.38 %) [1994 - 8,84 1 (24.86%, 45 .29%, 
29.62%, 0.23% )] 
KEMABONG 
1 .  Datuk Rubin Balang (BN-Sabah UMNO) 
2. David Jani (Bersekutu) 
3 .  Esar Andamas (PBS) 
Incumbent: Datuk Rubin Balang (BN-Sabah UMNO) - votes received, 1994: 
3 ,521 ; majority 1 , 150 (won seat on PBS) 
Voters 1999: 1 1 , 140 (Muslim bumiputera 14. 16%, non-Muslim bumiputera 
75.26%, Chinese 10.52%, others 0.06%) [1994 - 7,366 (21 . 1 8%, 67. 19%, 
1 1 .58%, 0.05% )] 
SU GUT 
1 .  Datuk Surady Kayong (BN-Sabah UMNO) 
2. Jamarudin Madirin (Bersekutu) 
3 .  Tuminggi @ Abd Mutalib Daud (Independent) 
4. Amran Masrah (Independent) 
5 .  Jublee KK Zen (PBS) 
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Incumbent: Surady Kayong (BN-Sabah UMNO) - votes received, 1 994: 2,403 ; 
majority 79 
Voters 1999: 7 ,182 (Muslim bumiputera 52.38%, non-Muslim bumiputera 
45.38%, Chinese 1 .33%, others 0.91 %) [ 1 994 - 7,386 (63 . 1 2%, 34.74%, 
1 .35%, 0.79%)] 
LAB UK 
1 .  Liaw Teck King (Independent) 
2. Datuk Tan Yong Gee (BN-PDS) 
3 .  Yusof Apok @ Joseph Apok (Setia) 
4. Datuk Michael Asang (PBS) 
5. Kamar Karim (Independent) 
6 .  Abdul Aziz Mohd Nasroh (Bersekutu) 
7 .  Nordin Khani (Independent) 
Incumbent: Tan Yong Gee (BN-PDS) - votes received, 1994: 3 ,256; majority 
1 ,076 (won seat on PBS) 
Voters 1999: 1 1 ,556 (Muslim bumiputera 64.69, non-Muslim bumiputera 
3 1 .34%, Chinese 2.82%, others 1 . 15%) [ 1994 - 8,847 (52. 1 2%, 44.76%, 
2.86%, 0.26% )] 
SUNGAI SIBUGA 
1 .  Datuk Musa Aman (BN-Sabah UMNO) 
2. Ramli Noordin (PBS) 
3. Musa Jala (Bersekutu) 
4. Isnain Amat (Setia) 
Incumbent: Datuk Musa Aman (BN-Sabah UMNO) - votes received, 1994: 
8,21 1 ;  majority 3, 708 
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Voters 1 999: 22,754 (Muslim bumiputera 67.75%, non-Muslim bumiputera 
4.25,  Chinese 27.89%, others 0. 1 1  % ) [ 1994 - 1 9,960 (68.75%, 5 .21  %, 
25.5%, 0.54% )] 
SEKONG 
1 .  Datuk Nahalan Damsal (BN-Sabah UMNO) 
2. Abdul Wahid Hamid (PBS) 
3. Zulkifli Pitting (Setia) 
4. Hamzah Abdullah (PAS) 
5. Ridi Alawangsa (Bersek:utu) 
Incumbent: Datuk Nahalan Damsal (BN-Sabah UMNO) - votes received, 1994: 
4,667 ; majority 1 ,548 
Voters 1999: 12, 16 1  (Muslim bumiputera 75 .76, non-Muslim bumiputera 
2.01 %, Chinese 21 .72%, others 0.5 1  %) [ 1 994 - 1 3,764 (75.85%, 5. 16%, 
18 .82%, 0. 17%)] 
ELOPURA 
1 .  Chong Ket Wah (PBS) 
2. Mohd Amran Saidin (Setia) 
3. Datuk Tham Nyip Shen (BN-SAPP) 
4. Ramli Hj Wen (Independent) 
5. Dr Chu Ying Kai @ Lawrence (Bersekutu) 
Incumbent: Datuk Tham Nyip Shen (BN-SAPP) - votes received, 1994: 
4,854;majority 870 
Voters 1999: 17, 144 (Muslim bumiputera 46.43, non-Muslim bumiputera 
2.21 %, Chinese 50.77%, others 0.59%) [1994 - 14,3 1 1  (3 1 .02%, 7 .85%, 
60.49%, 0.64% )] 
TANJUNG PAPAT 
1 .  Datuk Raymond Tan (BN-SAPP) 
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2. John Khoo Cheo Ping (Bersekutu) 
3 .  Ang Lian Hai (PBS) 
Incumbent: Datuk Raymond Tan (BN-SAPP) - votes received, 1994: 3,614; 
majority 87 
Voters 1999: 14,457 (Muslim bumiputera 28.94%, non-Muslim bumiputera 
1 .97%, Chinese 66.39%, others 2.7% ) [ 1994 - 12,605 (25.24%, 4%, 69.76%, 
1 %)] 
KARAMUNTING 
1 .  Wong Lien Tat (BN-LDP) 
2. Dr Chung Kwong Wing (Bersekutu) 
3 .  Lee Tze Ting (Independent) 
4. Thien Fui Yun (PBS) 
Incumbent: Datuk Lau Pui Keong (Ind); votes received, 1994: 4,219; majority 
1 13 
Voters 1999: 14,608 (Muslim bumiputera 39. 19%, non-Muslim bumiputera 
0.38%, Chinese 60.09%, others 0.34%) [ 1 994 - 12,218  (28.95%, 3.84%, 
67.03%, 0. 1 8%)] 
SUKAU 
1 .  Halban Janan (Independent) 
2. Pusing Baligang (Bersekutu) 
3 .  Mahlan Adari (PBS) 
4. Datuk Aklee Abas (BN-Sabah UMNO) 
5. Ustaz Ridwan Baharun (PAS) 
Incumbent: Datuk Aklee Abas (BN-Sabah UMNO) - votes received, 1994: 
3 ,504; majority 917 
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Voters 1999: 1 1 ,245 (Muslim bumiputera 96.63%, non-Muslim bumiputera 
1 .23%, Chinese 2.01 %, others 0 .1 3%) [ 1 994 - 10, 1 87 (94.07%, 3.41 %, 
2.01 %, 0.5 1 % )] 
KUAMUT 
1 .  Datuk Hj Abd Malek Chua (PBS) 
2. Datuk Joseph Siting Saang (BN-PDS) 
3.  Ali Latif Taha (Bersekutu) 
Incumbent: Datuk Joseph Siting Saang (BN-PDS) - votes received, 1994: 2, 1 84; 
majority 735 (won seat on PBS) 
Voters 1999: 10,362 (Muslim bumiputera 57.65%, non-Muslim bumiputera 
41 .44%, Chinese 0.88%, others 0.03%) [ 1994 - 5,452 (52.55%, 46.56%, 
0.83%, 0.06% )] 
KUN AK 
1. Mohd Amin Jaafar (Bersekutu) 
2. Rayman Udin (Setia) 
3. Abdullah Minun Sahirun (PBS) 
4. Jasa Rauddah Ismail (BN-Sabah UMNO) 
Incumbent: Unding Lana (BN-Sabah UMNO) - votes received, 1994: 5,241 ;  
majority 3,  179 
Voters 1999: 14,661 (Muslim bumiputera 94.28, non-Muslim bumiputera 
1 . 1 1  %, Chinese 3 .98%, others 0.63%) [ 1 994 - 14,858 (92.08%, 3.73%, 
3.89%, 0.30% )] 
LAHAD DATU 
1 .  Sulaiman Pangeran Atok (PBS) 
2. Abdul Banning Abd Mohamad (Setia) 
3. Samsu Baharun Abdul Rahman (BN-Sabah UMNO) 
4. Abdillah Abdul Hamid (Bersekutu) 
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Incumbent: Datuk Amat Yusof Jam.lee (BN-Sabah UMNO) - votes received, 
1994: 7,820; majority 1 , 144 
Voters 1999: 28, 1 10 (Muslim bumiputera 69.56%, non-Muslim bumiputera 
9. 1 1  %, Chinese 20.03%, others 1 .31  %) [ 1994 - 23,055 (69.39%, 10.29%, 
20.01 %, 0.3 1  %)] 
SULABAYAN 
1 .  Muhammad Yassin Hj Ibrahim (Independent) 
2. Abdul Salam Hj Maslah (Independent) 
3. Mohd Lan Allani (BN-Sabah UMNO) 
4. lspal Hj Abok (PBS) 
5. Datuk Askalani Abdul Rahim (Bersekutu) 
Incumbent: Datuk Nasir Tun Sakaran (BN-Sabah UMNO) (won in a by-election 
when Tun Sakaran Dandai was appointed TYT) 
Voters 1 999: 10,673 (Muslim bumiputera 99.82%, non-Muslim0.01 %, Chinese 
0.04%, others 0. 13%) [1994 - 17,626 (95.58%, 1 .05%, 3.35%, 0.02%)] 
SENALLANG 
1 .  Datuk Nasir Sakaran (BN-Sabah UMNO) 
2. Abdullah Sani Hj Ab SaUeh (Bersekutu) 
3 .  Sabardin Ombra (PBS) 
Voters 1 999: 14,556 (Muslim bumiputera 94.32%, non-Muslim bumiputera 
0.23%, Chinese 5 .3%, others 0. 15%) 
BAL UNG 
1 .  Kassim Thong (Bersekutu) 
2. Wong Fook Voon (PBS) 
3.  Datuk Mannan Jakasa (BN-Sabah UMNO) 
Incumbent: Datuk Mannan Jakasa (BN-Sabah UMNO) - votes received, 1 994: 
7 ,370; majority 2,058 
72 
Voters 1 999: 16,230 (Muslim bumiputera 75 .82%, non-Muslim bumiputera 
1 .76%, Chinese 1 8.3 1 %, others 4. 1 1  %) [ 1994 - 19,079 (69.68%, 5 .39%, 
24.25%, 0.68% )] 
MEROTAI 
1 .  Dr Patawari Patawe (BN-Sabah UMNO) 
2. Bacho Pendrongi (Independent) 
3. Majin Ajin (PBS) 
4. Abdurahman Ahmad @ Maidin (PAS) 
5. Mohd Ishak Awadan (Bersekutu) 
Incumbent: Datuk Abdul Ghapur Salleh (BN-Sabah UMNO) - votes received, 
1994: 9,5 15;  majority 6, 153 
Voters 1 999: 19,5 15 (Muslim bumiputera 77.88%, non-Muslim bumiputera 
3.26%, Chinese 1 8.42%, others 0.44%) [ 1 994 - 1 8,662 (8 1 .02%, 5 .78%, 
1 1 .74%, 1 .46% )] 
KALABAKAN 
1 .  Mohd Said Senang (Setia) 
2. Hamud Salleh (PBS) 
3. Badal @ Samsuddin Kamsa (Independent) 
4. Raden Kakung (Bersekutu) 
5. Abdul Wahid Yemang (PAS) 
6. Datuk Abdul Ghapur Salleh (BN-Sabah UMNO) 
Voters 1 999: 14,094 (Muslim bumiputera 15.55%, non-Muslim bumiputera 
13.48%, Chinese 9.07%, others 1 .9%) 
SRI TANJONG 
1 .  Datuk Michael Lim Yun Sang (BN-SAPP) 
2. Mohd Abidin Patangari (Independent) 
3. Samson Chin Chee Tsu (PBS) 
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4. Shanty Chong Chui Lin (Bersekutu) 
Incumbent: Datuk Micheal Lim Yun Sang (BN-SAPP) - votes received, 1 994: 
8,637; majority 926 (won seat on PBS) 
Voters 1999: 26,98 1 (Muslim bumiputera 37. 17%, non-Muslim bumiputera 
1 .65%, Chinese 60.5%, others 0.68%) [ 1994 - 24,720 (41 .72%, 1 .95%, 
56.09%, 0.24% )] 
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Table 4. Brief Party Profiles 
(Source: various newspaper reports) 
Sabah United Malay Nasional Organisation ( Sabah UMNO) 
UMNO was officially established in Sabah in February 199 1 .  UMNO president 
and Prime Minister, Dr Mahathir Mohamad, decided to spread UMNO's wings 
to Sabah in October 1990, the day PBS pulled out of Barisan Nasional in the 
heat of that year's general elections.  Paving the way for UMNO' s entry was the 
late Tun Mustapha Datu Harun's United Sabah National Organisation (USNO), 
which dissolved itself to allow its members to join Sabah UMNO. At the same 
time, Harris Salleh's Parti Berjaya was also dissolved so that its members could 
join Sabah UMNO, making it a party largely of ex-USNO and Berjaya 
members. Mustapha, a Suluk-Bajau chieftain, was Sabah UMNO's first member 
and chairman, and won for the party its first elected Sabah seat of U sukan in 
Kota Belud in a 1 99 1  by-election. When he quit UMNO during the February 
1 994 state elections, he was replaced by his deputy, Tun Sakaran Dandai, a 
Bajau leader from Sempoma. Sabah UMNO is currently led by Osu Sukam, a 
Malay from Papar, who is also Sabah chief minister. Based on the number of 
registered members, Sabah UMNO is the second largest party, with over 
300,000 members. 
Parti Demokratik Sabah (PDS) 
Former Sabah chief minister Bernard Dompok was the key man in the birth of 
the party, which took place just before the collapse of the PBS government 
following the 1 994 Sabah state elections. The idea was for ex-PBS leaders 
(Dompok was a former PBS deputy president) to have another vehicle to 
represent the Kadazan-Dusuns within the newly formed Sabah Barisan Nasional 
state government. Registration of the party was approved by Kuala Lumpur 
within a week, a record time for the registration of a political party. The day the 
party was approved, it was accepted into the Sabah BN. PDS has centered itself 
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in Penampang, which had never had a chief mm1ster until Dompok's 
appointment. The party was decimated in the 1 999 polls by PBS ,  and party 
leader Dompok lost his seat. At the party' s  fifth party congress in August 1999, 
it changed its name to United Pasok Momogun Kadazandusun Organisation 
(UPKO) 
Parti Bersatu Rakyat Sabah (PBRS) 
Like PDS,  PBRS was formed by a PBS dissident, Clarence Bongkos Malakun, 
just days before the collapse of the PBS government. Malakun, the pro tem 
president, handed over the party leadership to Joseph Kump at the party' s  launch 
in Penampang. A leadership tussle almost immediately ensued between Jeffrey 
Kitingan and Kurup. Kitingan disappeared from the party after the launch, 
saying he wanted to start his own Party Demokratik Rakyat Sabah (PDRS),  but 
shelved that plan and joined an existing BN component, Parti AKAR. PBRS has 
been active in the interior regions of Keningau, working among the Kadazan­
Dusuns and Muruts. The party was comprehensively defeated by PBS in the 
1999 polls. 
Angkatan Keadilan Rakyat Bersatu (AKAR) 
AKAR was formed in 1 989 after a bitter dispute between PBS president Joseph 
Pairin Kitingan and his deputy Mark Koding over the use of the terms Kadazan 
and Dusun. Koding's United Sabah Dusun Association did not want the name 
Dusun to be incorporated into the Kadazan Cultural Association led by Pairin. 
Koding, with several other PBS leaders (Pandikar Amin Mulia, an Iranun, and 
Kalakau Untol, a Dusun) decided to form AKAR. It was registered on 15  
September 1989, with Kalakau as  its president and Pandikar as  secretary­
general. Koding entered the party in November that year as president. AKAR 
joined BN soon after. In the May 1990 state elections, all 36 AKAR candidates, 
including Koding, Pandikar and Kalakau, lost their seats to their former party, 
PBS.  Again, in the October 1990 parliamentary election, AKAR failed to win a 
single seat. However, it managed to win one of the seven seats allocated by BN 
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in the 1 994 state elections, with Pandikar securing Tempasuk in Kota Belud; he 
was made a state minister. The party changed its name to AK.AR Bersatu after 
Jeffrey Kitingan entered the party at the end of 1994. A power struggle between 
Jeffrey Kitingan and Koding on one side and Pandikar on the other, erupted in 
1 995; Pandikar's group eventually took charge and changed the party' s  name 
back to Parti AKAR. Koding and Jeffrey Kitingan quit the party and have since 
returned to the PBS .  AKAR was totally wiped out in the 1 999 state election by 
PBS.  
Sabah Progressive Party (SAPP) 
SAPP was formed by C: dissidents in PBS just before the 1994 state elections. It 
was led by Yong Teck Lee, a former PBS deputy president, who revolted against 
Pairin in January 1 994 when Pairin decided to drop Yong and several of his men 
as candidates for the upcoming 1 994 state polls.  Yong and several Chinese 
leaders, including Elopura assemblyman Tham Nyip Shen, flew to Kuala 
Lumpur, had the party registered on 2 1  January, and joined BN immediately. 
SAPP declared that it wanted a state-federal reconciliation so as to bring Sabah 
into the mainstream of development. The party joined Barisan Nasional before 
the 1994 state elections and Yong Teck Lee was appointed Sabah chief minister 
for two years in May 1995 , under the Sabah BN rotation system. The party has 
pockets of support in urban areas of Kota Kinabalu, Sandakan and Tawau. It is 
the largest of the Chinese-based Sabah BN parties, and managed to win three of 
the five BN allocated seats in the 1 999 state elections. 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) 
LDP was born of a fresh effort to form a coalition of ethnic-based parties to 
oppose Parti Bersatu Sabah in 1989. Two veteran former Berjaya leaders, Hiew 
Ming Kong and Chong Kah Kiat, set out to form a Chinese-based multiracial 
party during the period in which Parti AKAR was also formed. Hiew, from 
Tawau, became party president and the Kudat-based Chong secretary-general. 
The party targeted Chinese professionals, with the hope of becoming the 
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dominant Chinese party in Sabah. It contested Chinese-dominated seats in the 
July 1990 state elections but failed to make any headway within Sabah's ethnic 
Chinese community, who maintained their support for PBS.  LDP's failure in the 
elections saw Hiew step down and Chong take over as president. The party 
stayed out of the 1990 general elections. Its fortunes dramatically changed with 
the pullout of the PBS from the BN during the October 1 990 general elections. 
LDP (and AK.AR) were immediately accepted into the BN fold. 
The LDP performed remarkably well in the 1999 polls, winning all the 
two seats allocated to it. 
Sabah Malaysian Chinese Association (Sabah MCA) NESE 
The Malaysian Chinese Association, the dominant Chinese BN party on the 
peninsula, expanded into Sabah in 1 99 1  following the entry of UMNO. Sabah 
MCA claimed a membership of 20,000 members in eighteen divisions with 
more than 200 branches throughout the state. In 1998 Chau Tet On became the 
first Sabahan to head Sabah MCA. Chau was first elected under the PBS banner 
in 1994. The MCA's sole candidate in the 1 999 state elections, he lost his seat to 
PBS. Sabah MCA is extremely weak as many Sabah Chinese see the party as 
nothing more than a lackey of UMNO, and as an outsider trying to meddle in 
Sabah politics. 
Sabah Gerakan 
Sabah Gerakan, an offshoot of the peninsula-based Gerakan, was formed in 
December 1995 as a result of a leadership tussle within the Liberal Democratic 
Party. In November 1995 the then Kudat state assemblyman, Kong Hong Ming, 
unsuccessfully challenged the LDP president, Chong Kah Kiat, for the party 
leadership. Having lost, Kong left with his supporters and a month later became 
Gerakan's first Sabah state chairman. Kong was, however, sacked from Sabah 
Gerakan in 1996 after he failed to support a government bill to curb the powers 
of the chief minister. His place was taken by Dr Chong Eng Leong, who also 
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quit, in May 1998 .  Sabah Gerakan came under the supervision of Gerakan 
national treasurer Soong Siew Hong. Sabah Gerakan is also very weak, suffering 
from the same perception problems as Sabah MCA. It has virtually no support 
among the Sabah Chinese community. Sabah Gerakan did not ask for any seats 
in the 1 999 polls. Kong has since rejoined PBS, a party he joined in the 1980s. 
He was defeated in the 1999 polls under the PBS banner. 
Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC) 
MIC, following the footsteps of UMNO and MCA, spread to Sabah in February 
1 994 to provide representation for the 25 ,000-odd Indian community, thinly 
spread all over the state. The party claims a membership of about 3,000 with 
twenty branches. Its Kota Kinabalu branch chairman, V. Jothi, became Sabah 
MIC chairman. The party did not ask for any seats in the 1 999 polls. It has little 
support among the Sabah Indian community. 
Parti Bersatu Sabah (PBS) 
PBS was formed just weeks before the April 1985 state election. Since its 
inception, it has been led by its founder, Joseph Pairin Kitingan, a Kadazan 
Roman Catholic married to an ethnic Chinese. Pairin, a former minister in the 
Sabah government led by Harris Salleh, was sacked from Berjaya in 1 984 after 
he raised the grievances of the Kadazan-Dusun and non-Muslim communities 
over issues of Islamization and Kadazan-Dusun rights. Forced to vacate his seat 
of Tambunan, Pairin easily won re-election as an independent. Widely regarded 
as a champion of the non-Muslims and the Kadazan-Dusuns, Pairin led PBS to 
victory in the 1 985 elections. Pairin' s  legitimacy among the Kadazan-Dusuns is 
due in large part to his position as Huguan Siou of the Kadazan-Dusun 
community. PBS ruled Sabah from 1 98 5  until 1 994 when mass defections 
caused the collapse of the newly re-elected PBS government. Although Pairin is 
PBS '  s major strength, he is also its main weakness - there is no clear successor 
to Pairin and there are doubts that PBS can survive without its founder. 
79 
Bibliography 
Chin, James, 1 994. 'Sabah state election of 1 994: end of Kadazan unity' , Asian 
Survey 34(10):904-915.  
1996a. 'PBDS and ethnicity in Sarawak politics ', Journal of 
Contemporary Asia 26(4) :5 12-526. 
___ l 996b. 'Back to square one: the 1995 general election in Sabah and 
Sarawak' , Borneo Research Bulletin 27:98-126. 
___ 1996c. 'The 1995 Malaysian general election: Mahathir's last triumph?' ,  
Asian Survey 36(4): 392-409. 
__ 1996d. 'Sarawak's 1 99 1  election: continuity of ethnic politics' , South 
East Asia Research 4(1) :21-40. 
1997. 'Politics of federal intervention in Malaysia, with reference to 
Kelantan, Sarawak and Sabah', Journal of Comparative Politics 35(2) 
(July) :  96- 120. 
__ 1999. 'Going east: UMNO' s entry into Sabah politics' , Asian Journal of 
Political Science 7(1 )  (June): 20-40. 
Crouch, Harold, 1 996. Government and Society in Malaysia. Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press. 
Government of Malaya. 1 963. Malaysia Report of the Inter-governmental 
Committee. Kuala Lumpur: Government Printer. 
Granville-Edge, P.J. and Devadason, Rajen, 1999. The Sabahan: The Life and 
Death of Tun Fuad Stephens. Selangor: Writers Publishing House Sdn. 
Bhd. 
Kahin, Audrey, 1 992. 'Crisis on the periphery: the rift between Kuala Lumpur 
and Sabah' ,  Pacific Affairs 65( 1)  (Spring) :  30-49. 
Kalimuthu, K.T., 1986. 'The Sabah state election of April 1 985 ' ,  Asian Survey 
26(7) (July): 8 15-837. 
80 
Kitingan, Joseph P. ,  1 986. 'Territorial integration, a personal view' ,  in Bonding 
Of A Nation: Federalism And Territorial Integration In Malaysia. Kuala 
Lumpur: Institute of Strategic and International Studies Malaysia (ISIS), 
pp. 10-18 .  
Lee, Edwin, 1 976. The Towkays Of Sabah: Chinese Leadership And Indigenous 
Challenge In The Last Phase Of British Rule. Singapore: Singapore 
University Press. 
Loh, Kok Wah. 1 992. 'Modernisation, ccultural revival And counter-hegemony: 
the Kadazans of Sabah in the 1 980s' , in Joel Kahn and Francis Loh Kok 
Wah (eds) ,  Fragmented Vision: Culture and Politics in Contemporary 
Malaysia. Sydney: Asian Studies Association of Australia in association 
with Allen & Unwin, pp. 225-253. 
Milne. R.S and Ratnam, K.J. ,  1974. Malaysia - New States in a New Nation: 
Political Development of Sarawak and Sabah in Malaysia. London: 
Frank Cass. 
Puthucheary, Mavis, 1 985. Federalism at the Crossroads: The 1985 Election in 
Sabah and their Implications for the Federal-State Relations. Kuala 
Lumpur: ISIS Malaysia. 
Roff, Margaret C. ,  1 974. The Politics Of Belonging: Political Change in Sabah 
and Sarawak. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press. 
Wee, Chong Hui, 1 995 . Sabah and Sarawak in the Malaysian Economy. Kuala 
Lumpur: INSAN. 
Yee, Stan (ed.) ,  1 992. J. Pairin Kitingan , the Making of a Malaysian: A 
Collection of Speeches by Datuk Joseph Pairin Kitingan During His 
First Two Terms of Office as the Chief Minister of Sabah, 1985-1990. 
Kuala Lumpur : Foto Technik. 
8 1  
Newspapers 
Borneo Mail (Kota Kinabalu) 
Borneo Post (Kota Kinabalu) 
Daily Express (Kota Kinabalu) 
New Straits Times (Kuala Lumpur) 
New Sunday Times (Kuala Lumpur) 
Overseas Chinese Daily News (Kota Kinabalu) 
Sabah Times (Kota Kinabalu) 
The Star (Kuala Lumpur) 
The Sunday Star (Kuala Lumpur) 
82 
Other Discussion Papers in the series are as follows: 
No. 2 State Determination and State Autonomy in Theories of Regime 
Maintenance and Regime Change (ISBN 0 73 15 1 250 2) 
No. 3 Some Conceptual and Empirical Issues in the Study of 
Regime Change (ISBN 073 15 1 25 1  0) 
No. 4 Tonga's Constitution and the Changing State 
(ISBN 073 15 1 252 9) 
No. 5 Political Development in Vietnam: From the Sixth to the 
Seventh National Party Congress (ISBN 0 7315 1 342 8) 
No. 6 Regime Change as Regime Maintenance: The Military 
versus Democracy in Fiji (ISBN 0 73 1 5  1 343 6) 
No. 7 Legitimacy, Sovereignty and Regime Change in the South 
Pacific: Comparisons Between the Fiji Coups and the 
Bougainville Rebellion (ISBN 0 73 15 1 344 4) 
No. 8 Semi-democracy in Malaysia: Pressures and Prospects for 
Change (ISBN 0 73 15 1473 4) 
No. 9 Colour, Class and Custom: The Literature of the 1987 Fiji 
Coup (ISBN 073 15 1474 2) 
No 10 Universal Suffrage in Western Samoa: The 1991 General 
Elections (ISBN 0 73 15 1474 2) 
No. 1 1  Democratizing China and Taiwan: Cultural and Institutional 











No. 12 Ethnicity and Interests at the 1990 Federated States of Micronesia 
Constitutional Convention (ISBN 0 73 15 1548 x) Glenn Petersen 
No. 13 Tradition versus Democracy in the Kingdom of Tonga 
(ISBN 073 1 6  1 82 1  7) 
No. 14 Cambodia: A Political Survey (ISBN 0 73 15 2025 4) 
No. 15 Comparing Regime Continuity and Change: Indonesia, 
Thailand and Malaysia (ISBN 0 73 15 2 154) 
No. 16 Managing Ethnic Conflict: The Case of Pakistan 
(ISBN 0 73 15 2 157 9) 




Tahir I. Shad 
& Jennifer Gray Reddish 
Josef Silverstein 
8 3  
No. 1 8  
No. 1 9  
No. 20 
No. 21  
(Re? )Discovering Chiefs: Traditional Authority and the 
Restructuring of Local-Level Government in Papua New 
Guinea (ISBN 073 15 2669 4) 
Indonesia: from Suharto to Democracy? (ISBN 073 15 267 1 6) 
South Korean Politics in Transition: Democratization, 
Elections and the Voters (ISBN 073 15 2670 8) 




New Guinea (ISBN 073 15 2366 0) Sinclair Dinnen, Ron May 
and Anthony Regan (eds) 
No. 22 Military Doctrines and Democratic Transition: 
A comparative Perspective on Indonesia's Dual Function 
and Latin American National Security Doctrines 
(ISBN 0 73 15 2676 7) 
No. 23 A Time to Change: The Fiji General Elections of 1999 
Other volumes in the series 
Jun Honna 
Brij V. Lal 
Regime Change in Afghanistan, Amin Saikal and William Maley. Published by 
Crawford House Press and Westview Press. 
The Fall of Soeharto, Geoff Forrester and R.J. May (eds). Published by Crawford 
House Publishing and C. Hurst & Co. 
The Military in Asia and the Pacific, R.J. May & Viberto Selochan (eds). Published 
by Crawford House Publishing and C. Hurst & Co. 
Burma-Myanmar: Strong Regime Weak State ?, Morten B. Pedersen, Emily Rudland 
and R.J. May (eds). Published by Crawford House Publishing. 
8 4  
For further information contact: 
Dept. Political and Social Change 
Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies 
The Australian National University 
Canberra ACT 0200 
Tel (02) 6249 5915;  Fax: (02) 6249 5523 
email: bevle_y_@coombs.anu.edu.au 


